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THE NEW SCHOOL SEGREGATION
Erika K. Wilson†
The South has a long and sordid history of resisting
school desegregation.  Yet after a long and vigorous legal fight,
by the mid-1980s, schools in the South became among the
most desegregated in the country.  An important but often un-
derappreciated tool that aided in the fight to desegregate
schools in the South was the conventional and strategic use of
school district boundary lines.  Many school systems in the
South deliberately eschewed drawing school district bound-
ary lines around municipalities and instead drew them
around counties.  The resulting county-based system of school
districts allowed for the introduction of school assignment
plans that crossed racially and economically segregated mu-
nicipal boundary lines.
Some affluent and predominantly white suburban munici-
palities in the South are threatening to reverse this progress.
They are doing so by seceding from racially diverse county-
based school districts and forming their own predominately
white and middle-class school districts.  The secessions are
grounded in the race-neutral language of localism, or the pref-
erence for decentralized governance structures.  However, lo-
calism in this context is threatening to do what Brown v.
Board of Education outlawed: return schools to the days of
separate and unequal with the imprimatur of state law.
This Article is the first to examine Southern municipal
school district secessions and the localism arguments that
their supporters advance to justify them.  It argues that local-
ism is being used as a race-neutral proxy to create segregated
school systems that are immune from legal challenge.  It con-
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cludes by introducing a normative framework to evaluate the
legitimacy of the localism justification for Southern school dis-
trict secessions specifically and decentralized public educa-
tion governance structures more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
They’re not only going to take the richer white kids out of
the district, they are going to take their money out of it.1
We believe that we can set a model, not only for the state of
Louisiana . . . .  We can set a model of governance for the
United States of America that many other cities can follow.2
Predominantly white and affluent suburbs in the South are
reviving an old method of resisting school desegregation: seced-
ing from racially diverse, county-based school districts and
forming their own racially homogenous school districts.3  In
Jefferson County, Alabama, for example, the city of Gardendale
recently voted to leave the Jefferson County School District in
1 Margaret Newkirk, Parents in Baton Rouge Try to Drop Out of School,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/arti
cles/2014-02-20/baton-rouge-parents-in-public-school-revolt-want-their-own-
city [http://perma.cc/3UP3-KPY9] (quoting local parent Tania Nyman).
2 Diana Samuels, St. George Report Lays Out ‘Potentially Harmful’ Impacts of
Proposed New City in East Baton Rouge Parish, TIMES-PICAYUNE, (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2013/12/
st_george_report_lays_out_pote_1.html [https://perma.cc/ZUF3-FZQU] (quoting
St. George spokesman Lionel Rainey).
3 This issue is receiving much attention in the national news. See, e.g.,
Susan Eaton, How a ‘New Secessionist’ Movement Is Threatening to Worsen School
Segregation and Widen Inequalities, NATION (May 15, 2014), http://www.thena
tion.com/article/179870/how-new-secessionist-movement-threatening-worsen-
school-segregation-and-widen-inequal# [https://perma.cc/4878-EYEG] (describ-
ing efforts by predominately white and socioeconomically advantaged cities to
secede from racially and economically diverse county-based school districts).
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order to form its own school district.4  Similarly, in East Baton
Rouge Parish, Louisiana, an unincorporated suburban terri-
tory called St. George is attempting to incorporate as its own
independent city for the sole purpose of forming its own school
district.5  If Gardendale and St. George are successful, the stu-
dents in the newly formed Gardendale and St. George school
districts will be overwhelmingly white and affluent.6  The
county-based school districts they leave behind will see a sig-
nificant increase in the percentage of poor and minority stu-
dents they enroll.7  Gardendale and St. George are not alone in
their secession efforts.  Suburbs throughout the South are se-
ceding from county-based school districts against a similar
backdrop of race- and class-based discord.8  Indeed, over the
last five years alone, more than ten suburban municipalities in
the South have either seceded, or attempted to secede, from
county-based school districts.9
4 See Kent Faulk, Jefferson County Board of Education Asks Federal Judge to
Decide Gardendale School Split, AL.COM (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.al.com/
news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/03/jefferson_county_board_of_educ_1.html
[https://perma.cc/M9Q4-8JB5] (describing the attempt by the city of
Gardendale, Alabama to leave the Jefferson County, Alabama school district and
form its own independent school system).
5 Newkirk, supra note 1. R
6 See JAMES A. RICHARDSON & ROY L. HEIDELBERG, SCHOOL DISTRICT RESTRUC-
TURING & REFORM: EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH 5–6 (2012) (analyzing the racial
demographics of schools if St. George were to create its own school district and
finding that St. George district would be primarily white with a median family
income of $90,000 while the East Baton Rouge System would see an overall
increase in the percentage of poor and Black students it enrolls, with a median
family income dropping from $74,067 to $60,562, an 18.3% decrease); Kent
Faulk, Judge: Significant Concerns Remain for Gardendale Schools Split, AL.COM
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/11/
judge_significant_concerns_rem.html [http://perma.cc/PF23-T8QU] (noting that
the changes in the Jefferson County school district racial demographics that
would occur if Gardendale is permitted to secede and form its own school district
would be that the majority of Black children—75%—who now go to Gardendale
High School but live outside of the proposed new Gardendale district boundary
lines would be forced to attend a school in Jefferson County that is already 89%
Black).
7 See Eaton, supra note 3 (describing how the demographics of the Jefferson R
County and East Baton Rouge Parish school districts will show an increase in the
number of minority students if Gardendale and St. George are successful in their
secession efforts).
8 See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg, Splintering School Districts: Understanding
the Link Between Segregation and Fragmentation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869,
894–98 (2009) (documenting the ways in which school district splintering in
Alabama widened racial and socioeconomic segregation between suburban and
county-based school districts); David Usborne, America’s New Apartheid: Prosper-
ous White Districts Are Choosing to Break Away from Black Cities and Go It Alone,
INDEP. (Aug. 27, 2014) (describing the race and class disparities in newly created
suburban school districts in Alabama and Georgia).
9 See Usborne, supra note 8. R
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The current wave of Southern suburban school district se-
cessions highlights a critical yet underexamined intersection
between school desegregation and state and local government
law.  State and local government law typically afford municipal-
ities the discretion to determine the breadth of services, such
as public education, that residents who live within a munici-
pality’s boundary lines receive.10  As a result, municipalities
can intentionally create distinct communities.11  They can do
so by exercising their substantial power over zoning and taxa-
tion policies to enact policies that have the effect of welcoming
certain types of residents, while excluding others.12  Notably,
the community creation function often occurs along the lines of
race and class.  Exclusionary zoning techniques in particular
regularly result in certain suburban municipalities consisting
primarily of white and affluent residents.13  When school dis-
trict boundary lines track municipal boundary lines, they can
reinforce the exclusionary effect of municipal community
creation.14
While similar secessions are occurring outside the South,15
Southern secessions raise unique equity and fairness con-
10 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropol-
itan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1130 (1996) (“Local boundaries frequently
determine the scope of local services . . . .  [L]ocalities are rarely obligated to
provide services beyond their borders.”).
11 See id. at 1142 (“Once bounded and incorporated, the locality has the
power to regulate land use and to design a mix of taxes and services that attracts
settlers the locality desires.  Moreover, boundaries themselves—apart from the
local public policies of incorporated communities—can mold the demographic
development of the locality.”).
12 See Gerald E. Frug, Is Secession from the City of Los Angeles a Good Idea?,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1783, 1792 (2002) (arguing that state allocation of zoning and
taxation authority to cities enables cities to exclude lower income people and to
make sure that the tax money generated from the wealthy is only spent on the
wealthy).
13 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geog-
raphy in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1861 (1994) (“[L]ocal boundaries,
once established, are difficult to alter; segregated localities form autonomous
political units whose internal political processes tend to replicate existing
demographics; wealthier localities have strong economic incentives to enact poli-
cies of exclusionary zoning to maintain homogeneity of class and therefore of race;
and, each of these factors tends to reinforce the others.”).
14 See Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism
in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1446 (2014) (discussing the role of
school district boundary lines in creating disparate student communities and
finding that “[w]hile local government boundary lines are racially stratified, racial
stratification along school district boundary lines is particularly acute”).
15 See Dale Murray, Presumptions Against School District Secession, 7 THEORY
& RES. EDUC. 47, 47–48 (2009) (noting that school district secession represents
the most common form of local government balkanization in the United States);
Kyle Spencer, Malibu Wants Out: Wealthy Seek Secession from School District,
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cerns.  In the South, the secessions are occurring against the
backdrop of a recent history of state-mandated racial segrega-
tion in schools, followed by lengthy and determined attempts to
evade court-mandated desegregation.16  Indeed, insofar as the
South is concerned, municipal secessions from county-based
school districts are an old trick.  In the aftermath of Brown v.
Board of Education,17 a number of predominantly white munic-
ipalities attempted to secede from county-based school dis-
tricts in order to avoid compliance with federal court school
desegregation orders.18  Those secession efforts were quashed
by the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Wright v. Council of
Emporia.19  There, the Court held that a municipality could not
secede from a county-based school district if the effect would
be to impede a county school system’s ability to desegregate
pursuant to a federal court desegregation order.20
The Wright decision was part of an important line of Su-
preme Court cases that sanctioned aggressive court interven-
tion to desegregate  school districts in the South that
previously engaged in de jure segregation.21  Such aggressive
NBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/
malibu-wants-out-wealthy-seek-secession-school-district-n238471 [http://
perma.cc/C4TK-V5SV] (“In recent years, ‘separatist movements’ . . . have become
increasingly common, as parents in mostly white, mostly middle-class communi-
ties in and around Memphis, Salt Lake City, Baton Rouge and Dallas, have sought
to break away from their more economically and racially diverse school
districts.”).
16 See infra subpart I.A.
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18 See, e.g., Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir.
1971) (“[W]here the formulation of splinter school districts, albeit validly created
under state law, have the effect of thwarting the implementation of a unitary
school system, the district court may not, consistent with the teachings of Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, recognize their creation.” (footnotes omitted) (citation
omitted)); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 749–54 (5th Cir. 1971)
(finding that it was unconstitutional for a city to remove its schools from the
county school district while the county school district was operating under a
federal court desegregation order if the effect and purpose of the removal was to
adversely impact school desegregation efforts in the county-based school system);
Burleson v. Cty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 308 F. Supp. 352, 356–57 (E.D. Ark.
1970) (holding that the Dollarway school system could not withdraw itself from
the Jefferson County schools because the effect would be to create a stark racial
and financial imbalance in the Jefferson County school district).
19 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
20 Id. at 470 (“[A] new school district may not be created where its effect would
be to impede the process of dismantling a dual system.”).
21 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201, 208 (1973) (extending
requirements to desegregate to districts that did not maintain de jure segregated
systems but in which school board actions resulted in de facto segregated
schools); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1971)
(emphasizing the broad remedial powers that district courts have to fashion effec-
tive school desegregation remedies); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38
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court intervention eventually resulted in Southern schools be-
coming among the most racially diverse in the country.22  Yet
the progress made toward school desegregation in the South
has slowly eroded since the 1980s.23  The erosion was caused
primarily by a normative retrenchment in cultural and legal
views about school desegregation.  Culturally, much of the
public—and even some African-American school desegregation
plaintiffs—raised doubts about both the merits and efficacy of
school desegregation and declined to aggressively pursue
school desegregation remedies.24  Legally, the Supreme Court
undermined the necessity of school desegregation by easing the
standards required for school districts to be released from fed-
eral school desegregation orders.25  Consequently, over the last
fifteen years, racial segregation in Southern schools has in-
creased substantially, in some areas coming close to the pre-
Brown levels.26  Suburban municipal secessions from county-
based school districts threaten to further the resegregation of
(1968) (noting that school systems had an  “affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary” to desegregate).
22 See GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & ERICA FRANKENBERG, SOUTHERN SLIPPAGE:
GROWING SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE MOST DESEGREGATED REGION OF THE COUNTRY 8
(2012), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integra-
tion-and-diversity/mlk-national/southern-slippage-growing-school-segregation-
in-the-most-desegregated-region-of-the-country/hawley-MLK-South-2012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D26J-TKWR] (“In an extremely short period of time—from the
mid-1960s to the early ‘70s—the formerly de jure segregated South rapidly be-
came the most integrated region of country for black students.  The gains made
during that timeframe persisted for several decades.” (footnotes omitted)).
23 See generally GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A
DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 3 (2001) (describing the trend toward resegregation
beginning in the 1990s).
24 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482 (1976)
(describing shifts in Black parents’ attitudes toward racial integration as an effec-
tive remedy for obtaining quality education for their children and the tension
between the parents and civil rights lawyers prosecuting school desegregation
cases).
25 See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegre-
gation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1645–46 (2003) (noting
that the possibility of district courts awarding school districts unitary status
seems all but guaranteed and that even school districts protesting unitary status
are awarded unitary status by district court judges).
26 GARY ORFIELD, JOHN KUCSERA & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, E PLURIBUS . . .
SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 33 (2012), https:/
/civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/
mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-
students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/7TQ6-
N465] (examining resegregation trends in the South and finding that “[m]ore than
60 years after the Brown decision rendered the separate but equal doctrine null
and void, these [resegregation] figures for black students highlight a significant
reversion to the all-black schools mandated during the Jim Crow-era”).
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schools in the South, and for this reason, they deserve close
scrutiny.
Proponents of Southern school district secessions justify
their efforts to secede through arguments related to localism—
namely that small, decentralized, municipally-based school
governance structures are preferable.27  They suggest that
more centralized county-based school systems are inefficient
and do not sufficiently meet the educational needs of students
because of the size and diversity of the county-based school
districts.28  They maintain that the creation of smaller, more
localized school districts will correct these problems.29
Yet, as with most modern invocations of localism, issues of
race and class lie right at the surface.30  Opponents of the
secessions argue that they reflect only the newest example of
resistance to school desegregation in the South.31  They sug-
gest that the white and affluent demographics of the newly
created districts32 demonstrate that the secessions may princi-
pally be rooted in a desire for separation rather than localism.33
They further argue that even if the localism justification is oth-
erwise legitimate, the secessions are not justifiable because
they have a negative financial impact on the remaining county-
27 See infra subpart III.A.
28 See Samuels, supra note 2 (reporting that St. George residents do not feel R
that Baton Rouge’s centralized, metropolitan form of government reflects their
values and that they desire a school system that is more responsive to the needs
of St. George students).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,
1993 (2000) (suggesting that localism with its focus on decentralization allows
localities to give in to their worst biases by engaging in practices that exclude
residents on the basis of race and class); Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and
Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice
Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 635 (2011) (“[P]urported justifications [for
localism] perpetuate pervasive falsities about the racial inequalities that now exist
between schools and school districts throughout the country.”).
31 See ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 4. R
32 See, e.g., John Archibald, Breakaway School Districts Are Shakespearean,
AL.COM (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/11/break-
away_school_districts_are.html [https://perma.cc/4D7C-SAHY] (describing the
racial implications of suburban secessions from school districts in Jefferson
County Alabama); Max Brantley, House Clears Bill to Pave Way for Sherwood,
Maumelle to Leave Pulaski School District, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/02/23/house-clears-
bill-to-pave-way-for-sherwood-maumelle-to-leave-pulaski-school-district [http://
perma.cc/2BFN-WP92] (noting the racial implications of the suburban Maumelle
leaving the Pulaski School District and comments suggesting that the state was
responsible for school segregation and should not allow the secession).
33 See Newkirk, supra note 1. R
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based districts and significantly increase racial segregation in
the county-based school districts.34
This Article is the first in the legal literature to examine the
resurgence of Southern school district secessions and the lo-
calism justification in which the secessions are grounded.  It
adds to the state and local government law literature on local-
ism by challenging the commonly held belief that localism in
public education is both desirable and quintessential to a well-
functioning democracy.35  It also proposes a new theoretical
framework for evaluating the localism justification of the school
district secessions in the South specifically and decentraliza-
tion of public education governance structures more broadly.
The Article proceeds as follows:
Part I provides an analysis and overview of the legal fight
for school desegregation in the South.  Part II provides a factual
and legal orientation to the issue of school district secessions
in the South and highlights the complexities presented by the
secessions.
Part III grounds the Southern school district secessions in
the state and local government literature on localism.  It ana-
lyzes whether the secessions represent a legitimate attempt to
reinvigorate public schools through localism, as proponents
suggest, or whether they perpetuate a more harmful form of
racial segregation that results in the creation of public school
enclaves exclusively for white and middle-class students, as
opponents suggest.
Part IV argues that some school district secessions reflect
an inadequately acknowledged dimension of localism: destruc-
tive localism.  It defines destructive localism as the use of de-
centralization to foster the tenets of localism for one group, but
in a way that divorces that group from serious social problems
and allows them to hoard and insulate vital resources.  The
Article then provides a framework for ferreting out whether
secessions evince destructive localism, finds that it does, and
contends that such secessions should therefore be disfavored.
While the framework provided by the Article is used in the
context of school district secessions, it could also be used to
evaluate the localism justification for decentralization of public
education governance structures more broadly.
34 See id.
35 See infra notes 278–279 and accompanying text. R
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I
THE FIGHT FOR DESEGREGATED SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH
A. Southern History of Using Municipal Secessions from
School Districts to Evade School Desegregation
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown,
particularly during the 1960s, school districts in the South
used many tools to resist desegregation.36  Municipal seces-
sions from county-based school districts were one of the more
popular tools used to resist school desegregation.  Predomi-
nately white municipalities in Alabama, Arkansas, Virginia,
Louisiana, and North Carolina, to name a few, attempted to
secede from county-based school systems shortly after the
counties were subject to school desegregation orders.37  The
municipalities all provided non-racially discriminatory reasons
for the secessions that, standing alone, could reasonably be
construed as valid reasons for secession.  For example, the
municipalities cited geographical distance and concerns re-
garding bussing young children;38 a desire to “control their
own schools and be in a position to determine their direc-
tion;”39 a desire to spend more money on their students and
36 For example, schools in the South often used freedom of choice plans or
resorted to closing down entire public school systems in order to avoid school
desegregation. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (finding
that freedom of choice plans that permitted all students to choose which schools
they wanted were an insufficient means of desegregating schools); Griffin v. Cty.
Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering Prince Edward County, Virginia, to reopen
schools that the County had closed in order to avoid operating a desegregated
school system).  For a comprehensive examination of the techniques used by
schools in the South to avoid school desegregation, see Kimberly Jenkins Robin-
son, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and Remedying How the
Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 800
(2010) (“In response to the Court’s tentative and vague decision in Brown II, most
of the South waged a campaign of ‘massive resistance’ to the decision that in-
cluded almost all of the congressmen and senators from the South signing a
pledge that denounced and pledged to overturn Brown.”).
37 See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 65, 67–72 (E.D.N.C.
1970); Wright v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671, 674 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev’d sub
nom. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 407 U.S.
451 (1972)); Burleson v. Cty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 308 F. Supp. 352, 352–57
(E.D. Ark. 1970).
38 See Burleson, 308 F. Supp. at 353 (noting that an area called Hardin was a
part of the Dollarway School District but located a substantial distance from other
municipalities and schools within the district; residents sought to secede in the
wake of the enforcement of Brown and cited concerns regarding bussing younger
children to and from school).
39 Halifax Cty. Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. at 72.
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increase the quality of education their students received;40 and
a desire to have a school system exclusively for the students
within the municipality’s boundary lines.41  Remarkably, many
of the justifications given for the secessions back then are simi-
lar to the justifications advanced today.42
Notwithstanding these seemingly legitimate and racially
neutral reasons, the secessions all occurred against the back-
drop of pending federal court desegregation decrees.43  African-
American plaintiffs claimed that the secessions were being
used as a pretext to thwart desegregation and challenged the
secessions.44  Many of the district courts sided with the Afri-
can-American plaintiffs, finding that any benefit to individual
municipalities gained through secession was outweighed by
the detrimental obstacles the secessions placed on the ability of
county-based systems to desegregate.45  The district courts
were clear that any improvement to the education received by
students in one municipality could not come at the expense of
the ability of the county school system to desegregate and pro-
vide a high-quality education for all students.46
40 See Wright, 309 F. Supp. at 674 (noting that one of the reasons for the
secession was that “[t]he city clearly contemplates a superior quality educational
program. . . . [T]he cost will be such as to require higher tax payments by city
residents”).
41 See Lee, 448 F.2d at 752 (noting that the city of Oxford’s asserted basis for
seceding from Calhoun County schools was “its freedom to keep its pupils in
schools within the city limits”).
42 See infra Part II.
43 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. R
44 See Lee, 448 F.2d at 752; Wright, 309 F. Supp. at 674; Burleson v. Cty Bd.
of Election Comm’rs, 308 F. Supp. 352, 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
45 See, e.g., Wright, 309 F. Supp. at 680–81 (holding that even where seces-
sion has the potential to improve education quality in the seceding municipality,
“separation [is] barred where the impact on the remaining students’ right to at-
tend fully integrated schools would be substantial”).
46 See, e.g., Lee, 448 F.2d at 752 (“The city cannot secede from the county
where the effect—to say nothing of the purpose—of the secession has a substan-
tial adverse effect on desegregation of the county school district.  If this were
legally permissible, there could be incorporated towns for every white neighbor-
hood in every city.”); Aytch v. Mitchell, 320 F. Supp. 1372, 1376–77 (E.D. Ark.
1971) (“From the record established in this proceeding, the testimony of wit-
nesses, exhibits thereto, arguments of counsel and briefs the Court concludes
that the division of the existing district as proposed would inflict severe damage
upon the Coleman area.  If the Coleman district proposed to be established had to
rely upon the revenues that it would receive, it is questionable that it could
provide any kind of quality education for its students or improve or maintain its
present accreditation.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 65, 72 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (“The effect of the new unit on the
other students in the county would be to leave the Halifax County unit with fewer
whites in its school system.”); Burleson, 308 F. Supp. at 357 (“While the Court is
satisfied that a desire to escape the impact of the Court’s decree was not the sole
motive for the circulation of the election petitions and was not the sole factor
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In 1972, the Supreme Court weighed in definitively on the
issue in Wright v. Council of Emporia.47  There, the Court con-
sidered a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that devi-
ated from most lower court decisions and allowed the city of
Emporia, Virginia to secede from the Greensville County School
District.48  The Fourth Circuit applied a dominant purpose test
and held that where “the creation of a new school district is
designed to further the aim of providing quality education and
is attended secondarily by a modification of the racial balance
. . . the federal courts should not interfere.”49  In a sharp depar-
ture from the standard outlined by the Fourth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court determined that in assessing the constitutionality
of a municipal secession from a school district under a federal
court desegregation order, courts should not be guided by the
motivation of the officials but by the effect of the secession.50
The Court noted that the Emporia secession would have
the effect of substantially impeding desegregation: the Greens-
ville County School District would be 72% Black and only 28%
white whereas the newly created Emporia School District
would be 48% white and 52% Black.51  The Court also ex-
pressed concern that the creation of the new district would
encourage white flight to Emporia and deny Black students
what “Brown II promised them: a school system in which all
vestiges of enforced racial segregation have been eliminated.”52
As a result, the Court deemed the secession unconstitutional.
The import of the Court’s decision in Wright was, at least tem-
porarily, to preclude Southern municipalities from using
school district secessions as a means of avoiding court-ordered
school desegregation.53
taken into consideration by Hardin residents who voted for secession, the Court is
also convinced and finds that the belief or hope of the Area residents that by
seceding from Dollarway they could keep their children out of integrated schools
or at least would be able to send them to districts having a smaller Negro popula-
tion than Dollarway was a powerful selling point for the measure in the Area.”).
47 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
48 See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1971),
rev’d, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
49 Id. at 572.
50 See 407 U.S. at 462.
51 Id. at 464.
52 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
53 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, once a school district under a
federal court desegregation order achieved unitary status, a municipality could
lawfully secede as long as the secession was not motivated by racial animus or an
intent to discriminate. See id. at 470 (“As already noted, our holding today does
not rest upon a conclusion that the disparity in racial balance between the city
and county schools resulting from separate systems would, absent any other
considerations, be unacceptable. . . . Once the unitary system has been estab-
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B. Southern School Desegregation Progress: The Role of
the Courts and School District Boundary Lines
The Wright decision was critical in facilitating school deseg-
regation in the South.  It ensured that school district boundary
lines could not be redrawn to “limit the scope or effectiveness of
a school desegregation remedy . . . [by] increas[ing] white flight
from one of the local school districts.”54  It was also consistent
with a stream of aggressive Supreme Court decisions issued
during the 1960s and early 1970s that required Southern
school districts to take affirmative steps to desegregate their
schools;55 analyzed the actual effects of desegregation plans to
ensure that they were effective before finding them permissi-
ble;56 and allowed for the implementation of mandatory black-
white student quotas in student assignment and large-scale
bussing plans.57
As a result of these far-reaching orders, school desegrega-
tion in the South increased exponentially.58  For example, in
1968 almost 80% of Black students in the South attended in-
tensely racially segregated schools; however, that figure fell to
23% by 1980.59  In large part because of the aggressive actions
taken by federal courts,60 the South continues to report the
lowest overall levels of racial segregation in schools across all
regions of the country even today.61
lished and accepted, it may be that Emporia, if it still desires to do so, may
establish an independent system . . . .”).  As discussed in Part II, a number of
school districts in the South have been released from federal school desegregation
orders and are no longer subject to the Wright test for determining the constitu-
tionality of municipal secessions from county-based school districts.
54 Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 364, 386 (2015).
55 See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968).
56 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
57 See id. at 22–25
58 See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that until the 1980s, R
“[s]ubstantial desegregation was most common in the 17 states which had legal
apartheid—segregation mandated by law—in their schools before the 1954 Brown
decision”).
59 ORFIELD, KUCSERA & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 26, at 34 tbl.11. R
60 See id. at 44.  Notably, federal legislation was also instrumental in speed-
ing up the pace of school desegregation in the South.  Some commentators sug-
gest that federal legislation was a critical catalyst in getting Southern schools to
desegregate. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9–10 (1994) (“Only after the 1964 Civil Rights
Act threatened to cut off federal educational funding for segregated school dis-
tricts and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 adopted
stringent enforcement guidelines did the integration rate in the South rise to 32%
in 1968-1969 and 91.3% in 1972-1973.”).
61 ORFIELD, KUCSERA & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 26, at 44; see also Gary
Orfield, The Southern Dilemma: Losing Brown, Fearing Plessy, in SCHOOL RESEGRE-
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By contrast, in other parts of the country, high levels of
racial segregation in schools have always existed and continue
to persist today.62  A primary culprit in the continued high
levels of segregation in schools outside of the South is the
traditional scale at which those school districts have long been
organized.  Outside of the South, particularly in the Northeast
and Midwest, school district boundary lines often track munic-
ipal boundary lines, meaning that each individual municipality
has its own school district.63  Importantly, high levels of resi-
dential racial segregation tend to exist across municipal
boundary lines.64  Thus, individual municipalities often come
to be known as a predominately white or predominately minor-
ity municipality.  As a result, when school district boundary
lines track municipal boundary lines, similar patterns of racial
segregation emerge between school districts.65
Yet through its 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley,66 the
Supreme Court eventually afforded legal immunity to the kinds
of interdistrict school segregation that often plagues schools in
the Northeast and Midwest.  In Milliken, the Court severely lim-
ited the remedial authority of federal courts to issue desegrega-
tion orders between school districts by requiring a finding that
there be both an “interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect”
before imposing such an order.67  The aforementioned stan-
dard is a difficult one to meet, and only a handful of courts
have ordered an interdistrict desegregation order since the
GATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK 1, 6–7 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds.,
2005) (describing the progress made in the South towards school desegregation
and noting that “[b]y the end of the 1960s, the South experienced a level of
interracial schooling that had probably never been seen anywhere in American
history on a large scale”).
62 See Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential
Segregation: How Do Boundaries Matter?, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 182, 197–200 (2008)
(describing high levels of school segregation outside of the South due to school
district fragmentation and racial segregation between districts); Gary Orfield, Why
It Worked in Dixie: Southern School Desegregation and Its Implications for the
North, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 24, 38 (Adam Yarmolinsky et al. eds.,
1981) (describing the structures in the North that made desegregation of schools
difficult, including migration patterns and local government structures).
63 Wilson, supra note 14, at 1438–39. R
64 Id.
65 Id.  For a historical analysis of the patterns of residential segregation
outside of the South that led to segregation within schools outside of the South,
see also HARRY S. ASHMORE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS 78 (1954) (chronicling
school segregation outside of the South and noting that “segregation in education
in the non-South will not be eliminated so long as rigidly segregated residential
patterns survive”).
66 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
67 Id. at 745 (“[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there
is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.”).
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Court’s decision in Milliken.68  Consequently, the racial segre-
gation between school districts often seen in the Northeast and
Midwest is an intractable problem.
In contrast, as previously noted, the school district bound-
ary lines in the South are more likely to track county boundary
lines than municipal boundary lines.69  Thus, neighboring mu-
nicipalities in the South are likely to share county-wide school
districts rather than have their own independent school dis-
tricts.70  Ironically, many school districts in the South were
initially organized at the county level rather than the municipal
level, in part, so that de jure school segregation laws could
easily be enforced.71  After Brown, the county-wide organiza-
tional structure was helpful for the inverse reason.  The
county-wide structure made it much easier to desegregate
schools in the South due to the large population from which
students could be drawn.72  The wide scale made it difficult for
whites to escape school desegregation by moving to a neighbor-
ing city or municipality.73
68 See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778
F.2d 404, 407–08 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d
1101, 1116–17 (7th Cir. 1980); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 756 (3d Cir.
1978); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1359–61 (6th
Cir. 1974).
69 See William A. Fischel, The Congruence of American School Districts with
Other Local Government Boundaries: A Google-Earth Exploration 10 (Mar. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[T]he South’s most typical
[school district] arrangement is a rural county school district surrounding a sin-
gle, separate central-city district.  Most of the South lacks the multitude of inde-
pendent suburban jurisdictions that characterize the North and the larger cities
in the West.”).
70 Id.
71 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, MAKING THE GRADE: THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 181 (2009) (“A single school district thus had to manage both
white and black schools.  Running two parallel, if not exactly equal, school sys-
tems over the same territory meant that school districts had to be bigger.”); LOUIS
R. HARLAN, SEPARATE and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the
Southern Seaboard States 1901-1915 11–15 (1958) (describing how Southern
schools were arranged into county districts and noting that in the county-based
districts the financial and social costs of running a dual system were large).
72 See DIANA PEARCE, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING PATTERNS 7 (1980).
73 See id. at 45 (researching the impact of metropolitan-wide school desegre-
gation on residential housing choices and finding “[a]t the neighborhood level . . .
a metropolitan desegregation plan by definition removes white enclaves as far as
the school is concerned.  If minority families move into one’s neighborhood, one
can flee residential integration, but not school integration.”); FISCHEL, supra note
71, at 183 (“The modern irony is that the South’s oversize school districts, which R
were created to assure white control of black schools, now make it difficult for
Southern whites to avoid desegregation by moving to the suburbs with indepen-
dent school districts.”)
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Indeed, during the 1980s, because of their “large, often
county-wide [organizational structure], southern schools were
more integrated than southern neighborhoods.”74  To the ex-
tent that Southern municipal secessions reduce this scale by
allowing school district boundary lines to track municipal
boundary lines, the secessions threaten to impose upon the
South the same types of interdistrict segregation that exists in
other parts of the country.75
C. The Implications of Southern School Desegregation
Progress
The widespread progress that the South made in desegre-
gating its schools undoubtedly benefited the region.  To be
sure, a vast body of research suggests that all students benefit
from attending desegregated schools.76  White students gain
better critical thinking and problem solving skills, a diminished
likelihood of harboring racial prejudices, and higher levels of
cultural competencies.77  Research also provides evidence that
white students are also not harmed in any way by attending
desegregated schools.78
For minority students, the benefits of attending desegre-
gated schools include a decrease in black-white achievement
74 DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2010 PERSPECTIVE 95 (4th
ed. 2013).
75 For a further discussion on how Southern school district secessions
threaten to make school districts in the South mirror racial segregation in other
parts of the country, see infra Part III.
76 See generally Janet Ward Schofield & H. Andrew Sagar, Desegregation,
School Practices, and Student Race Relations, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 58, 59 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983) (finding
that the social impact of desegregation may be more important in influencing
occupational and social success of students than any academic impact); Meyer
Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic Achieve-
ment: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 268 (1975)
(examining the effects of school desegregation and concluding that “overall, deseg-
regation does indeed have a positive effect on minority achievement levels,” but
noting that most studies suffer from definitional and methodological weaknesses).
77 Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, How Non-Minority Students Also Benefit from Ra-
cially Diverse Schools, NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY RES. BRIEF No. 8, Oct. 2012, at
2.
78 See Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at app. 19, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of 553] (“Numerous
studies—recent as well as those that were conducted in the immediate aftermath
of court-ordered desegregation—suggest that school desegregation has little or no
measurable negative impact on the test scores of white students.  Thus, fears that
desegregation will undermine their achievement seem unfounded.”).
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gap scores;79 access to higher quality teachers and curricu-
lum;80 and “increased . . . college quality and adult earnings,
reduced . . . probability of incarceration, and improved adult
health status.”81
While the benefits of desegregated education are often
touted, criticisms of desegregation certainly exist.82  Such criti-
cisms make it easy to downplay the significance of the potential
resegregative effects of Southern municipal school district se-
cessions.  One of the primary criticisms of school desegregation
is that the benefits of school desegregation are “highly varia-
ble . . . , [and] the effects . . . modest.”83
While the research in this regard is indeed varied,84 a sub-
stantial body of research unequivocally demonstrates that stu-
dents are harmed by attending racially segregated schools.85
79 See generally Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel, Introduction to
STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS: INEQUALITY AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE
GAP 1, 5–11 (2008) (demonstrating that the period of greatest progress in closing
the gap coincided with the historic push for school desegregation in the 1960s and
1970s.  Stagnation came after efforts to integrate schools slowed down.  Today,
the test score gap is nearly 50% larger in states with the highest levels of school
segregation); Kirsten Kainz & Yi Pan, Segregated School Effects on First Grade
Reading Gains, 29 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 531, 535 (2014) (finding that African
American students’ early reading developments, more so than any other racial
group, are compromised by attending racially segregated schools).
80 See Brief Amicus Curiae of 553, supra note 78, at 10–11 (finding that R
students who attend predominantly minority schools have less access to stable
and high-quality teachers and that honors and Advanced Placement courses are
not equally available at schools serving large percentages of minority students).
81 Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation & School
Quality on Adult Attainments 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16664, 2011).
82 See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73
27 (1975); David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INT. 90, 109–10
(1972).
83 David J. Armor & Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in
Public Schools, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE 219, 239 (Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan
Thernstrom eds., 2002).
84 See, e.g., NANCY H. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN
18–22 (1975) (finding that the academic effects of integration were mixed); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341,
357–60 (1975) (questioning the efficacy of school desegregation and exploring
other avenues such as Black community control as a means of increasing the
quality of education for Black students); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Deseg-
regation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 17, 24 (1978) (reviewing seventy-three studies and finding forty with posi-
tive results and twelve with negative).
85 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources
and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 404–09 (2012)
(documenting the research that shows the harm that minority students suffer as
a result of attending racially segregated schools); Christopher S. Jencks, The
Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 69, 71 (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972) (“The
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For minorities, attending racially segregated schools limits
their access to high-quality and stable teaching staffs.86  It also
denies them access to quality facilities, curricula, and peers
who can positively influence the learning environment.87  For
white students, attending nearly all-white schools limits their
exposure to non-white students and increases the likelihood
that they will harbor racial prejudices and manifest those
prejudices in harmful ways.88  Thus, even if the benefits of
desegregated education are minimal, the harms of segregation
are not.  For that reason, maintaining desegregated schools is
important.
Another criticism of school desegregation is that it encour-
ages white flight.  The line of argument here is that while courts
can mandate an end to state-sponsored discrimination, they
cannot use judicial remedies to interfere with private associa-
tional choices.89  A significant number of whites—particularly
during the early stages of desegregation—did indeed flee school
systems at least in part to avoid school desegregation.90  Impor-
tantly, however, during this same time period whites also fled
achievement of lower-class students, both black and white, was fairly strongly
related to the socioeconomic level of their classmates.”).
86 See Brief Amicus Curiae of 553, supra note 78, at 10–11, app. 31. R
87 See id. at 11–12.
88 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety
and the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1794 (chronicling
the harms of growing up in a racially segregated white community and noting that
“segregation foreclosed my opportunity ever to know [minorities], [and] it was a
psychologically damaging and educationally destructive experience for my white
friends and myself”); Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration,
63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 643 (2011) (noting that empirical evidence shows that white
racially and ethnically homogenous neighborhoods and schools breed negative
prejudices and stereotypes against minority groups).
89 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (arguing that if “freedom of association is
denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon those for whom it is
unpleasant or repugnant”).
90 For a comprehensive examination of the research surrounding the issue of
school desegregation and white flight, see Thomas F. Pettigrew & Robert L. Green,
School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman “White Flight”
Thesis, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1, 33–40 (1976) (challenging Coleman’s studies of
white flight on methodological and conceptual grounds); Christine H. Rossell,
Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of
School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80–94 (1983) (examining the
relationship between desegregation and white flight).  Further, the flight was ar-
guably not just white flight but middle-class flight as Black residents with the
means often flee core cities for suburban cities with better services and better
performing schools. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs
and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 768–71 (2001) (describing the ways in which middle-class
Black flight in some ways both parallels and diverges from middle-class white
flight).
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cities that had school systems that were not under court-man-
dated desegregation orders.91
Rather than a per se rejection of desegregation, white flight
can also be viewed as flowing from a failure of the judiciary to
meaningfully implement school desegregation policies.  Indeed,
the Court’s decision in Milliken effectively limited the scope of
desegregation orders and created suburban enclaves that were
immune from desegregation.92  White flight can only occur in
metropolitan areas in which white enclaves exist to which
whites can flee.93  Failure to enact comprehensive school de-
segregation plans allowed whites to escape desegregation by
fleeing to a neighboring jurisdiction within the metropolitan
area.94  In areas with larger metropolitan-wide school desegre-
gation requirements, white flight was significantly less than in
areas with more geographically limited school desegregation
boundaries.95  Thus, the failure to fully commit to school de-
segregation by broadening the scope of desegregation plans
within metropolitan areas, not school desegregation, was ar-
guably the primary cause of white flight.96
In sum, Southern schools experienced significant desegre-
gation as a result of aggressive federal court desegregation or-
ders.  School desegregation was on the whole beneficial for all
students in the South.  As the following subpart explains, the
critical gains in desegregation in the South have eroded in large
part due to a series of Supreme Court cases issued during the
1990s that significantly narrowed students’ right to demand a
desegregated education.
91 See generally ORFIELD, KUCSERA & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 23. R
92 Daniel Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken’s Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137,
138 (2013) (“[D]istrict boundaries made sacrosanct by Milliken represent a major
impediment to confronting the persistent gap in educational opportunity.”).
93 PEARCE, supra note 72, at 45 (researching the impact of metropolitan wide R
school desegregation on residential housing choices and noting that “[a]t the
neighborhood level . . . a metropolitan desegregation plan by definition removes
white enclaves as far as the school is concerned.  If minority families move into
one’s neighborhood, one can flee residential integration, but not school
integration”).
94 Id.
95 Erica Frankenberg, The Impact of School Segregation on Residential Hous-
ing Patterns: Mobile, Alabama, and Charlotte, North Carolina, in SCHOOL RESEGRE-
GATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra note 61, at 164, 180. R
96 Id. at 180 (“When school districts are completely desegregated, pressure
lessens for whites with children to move out of racially mixed neighborhoods . . .
since racial balance is guaranteed at all area schools.”).
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D. The Supreme Court’s Decontextualization of Race in
School Desegregation Cases and the Return of
Segregated Schools in the South
Despite the positive benefits of desegregated schools for
both minority and white students, Southern states are increas-
ing the list of places with intense racial segregation in
schools.97  A significant cause of this resegregation is that the
Supreme Court’s more recent school desegregation jurispru-
dence significantly narrowed students’ ability to receive a de-
segregated education.  That legal pathway for students to
challenge racially segregated education was first laid out in
Brown v. Board of Education (hereinafter Brown I)98 and more
concretely spelled out in Green v. County School Board of Edu-
cation.99  In Green, the Court was clear that the right to a
desegregated education means that officials must take “affirm-
ative . . . steps” to eliminate the effects of de jure segregation
“root and branch.”100  The Court also listed six areas, com-
monly referred to as the Green factors, that must be desegre-
gated before a school district can be released from a federal
school desegregation order.101
While the Supreme Court did not articulate a specific
formula for determining when a school district can be success-
fully deemed to have eliminated prior de jure segregation “root
and branch,” the Court was unequivocal in insisting that
97 See ORFIELD, KUCSERA & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 26, at 44 (“During the
era of court-ordered desegregation and enforcement, virtually no southern states
appeared in the rankings.  More recently, though, the rollback of desegregation
efforts has led to a situation where at least 3 to 4 southern states have emerged in
the top 20 on selected measures of black student segregation.”); Sean F. Reardon
& John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from
School Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563, 1585 (2003)
(“Public school segregation between white and black students in southern states
increased slightly in the 1990s, reversing several decades of stable integration
patterns in most of the South.”). But cf. Armor & Rossell, supra note 83, at 254 R
(“The biggest threat to desegregation is not the dismantling of plans but rather the
inexorable demographic changes that have left the majority of larger school sys-
tems predominately minority.”).
98 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  The core principles of what Brown stood for were
(and still are) subject to much debate.  For a detailed discussion of the meaning of
Brown and the ways in which the conception of what Brown meant have changed
over time, see generally James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties:
Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative
Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1990).
99 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
100 Id. at 437–38.
101 These factors include faculty, staff, the assignment of students to particu-
lar schools, extracurricular activities, facilities, and transportation.  See id. at
435–36.
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school districts “fashion steps which promise realistically to
convert promptly to a system without a ‘white’ school and a
‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”102  Thus, Green can fairly be
read as standing for the proposition that, at least initially and
in the remedial context, school systems found to have violated
the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining racially segregated
schools had a remedial obligation to provide students with
non-racially identifiable schools.  Such a reading of Green is
buttressed by the Courts repeated admonitions about the
harms of racially segregated schools in Brown, Green, and sub-
sequent cases.103
Yet, in the decades that followed Green, the Supreme Court
significantly narrowed the obligation of previously de jure
school systems to provide students with a desegregated educa-
tion.  It did so by decontextualizing the significance of race
when examining the continued necessity of ongoing federal
court school desegregation orders.104  Bluntly stated, the Court
either ignored or denied the salience of schools becoming ra-
cially identifiable, particularly schools becoming identifiable as
predominately Black schools.105  Instead of acknowledging the
harms of racially identifiable schools as it had once done, the
Court looked at the race of the students attending the schools
as “neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely ‘skin color’
or country of ancestral origin . . . [completely] unrelated to
ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.”106  Two critical ex-
amples from the Supreme Court’s more recent school desegre-
gation jurisprudence demonstrate how the Court’s
decontextualization of race significantly narrowed students’
right to a desegregated education.
102 Id. at 442.
103 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971) (“Segregation was the evil struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution.”); Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (“[C]ontinued operation of segregated schools under
a standard of allowing ‘all deliberate speed’ for desegregation is no longer consti-
tutionally permissible.  Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of
every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate
now and hereafter only unitary schools.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954) (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”).
104 See Liebman, supra note 98, at 352–55 (describing the Court’s treatment of R
Brown in the decades following the decision).
105 See id.
106 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1991).
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First, the Court pivoted dramatically from the results-ori-
ented principles articulated in Green and instead began to fo-
cus on the purported efforts put forth by school districts to
desegregate schools.  Most notably, in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City School District v. Dowell,107 the Court was asked
to consider whether a school district achieved “unitary sta-
tus”108 and could be released from a federal court desegrega-
tion order.109  The Court determined that the appropriate test
to use in answering that question was whether a district “com-
plied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered” and “the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable.”110
The test articulated in Dowell marked a substantial nar-
rowing of school systems that previously maintained de jure
segregated school systems to provide students with a desegre-
gated education in the remedial context.  Instead of students
being entitled to specific results (e.g., the right to attend non-
racially identifiable schools), under Dowell, students were
deemed to be entitled to school officials’ “best efforts” to provide
a desegregated school.  Such a focus on “best efforts” inher-
ently meant that courts were left in the difficult position of
attempting to judge the subjective intent of school officials to
create non-racially identifiable schools.111  Indeed, the district
court on remand in Dowell acknowledged the difficulty of gaug-
ing school officials’ subjective intent and engaged in only a
cursory review of the efforts taken by school officials to deseg-
regate before deciding that school officials did employ their
“best efforts.”112
107 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
108 Id. at 244.  For a discussion of what “unitary status” means, see generally
Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary
Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1105, 1107–08 (1990) (noting that “[a] school system has achieved unitary
status when a federal court determines that it is not only desegregated but also
has eliminated the vestiges of its prior racial discrimination” and going on to
describe the vagaries as to when a school district is determined to have met this
standard); Parker, supra note 25, at 1631 n.50 (describing unitary status as “the R
end point of school desegregation litigation.  Once a school district is determined
to have converted from ‘black schools’ and ‘white schools’ to ‘just schools’ . . . .”).
109 498 U.S. at 244.
110 Id. at 249–50 (emphasis added).
111 See Robinson, supra note 36, at 823–24 (arguing that the standard articu- R
lated in Dowell necessitated an emphasis on subjective intent that marked a
substantial departure from the Court’s previous standards for determining com-
pliance with school desegregation orders).
112 Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1157
(W.D. Okla. 1991) (“Plaintiffs . . . do not offer any suggestion or hint of any
noncompliance with the tenets of the decree from 1977–1985.  Effective compli-
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Further, the Dowell standard also introduced into the
school desegregation lexicon the concept of eliminating the ves-
tiges of past discrimination “to the extent practicable.”  This
marked yet another sharp departure from Green, this time from
the “root and branch” requirements.  Under the “extent practi-
cable” standard, school officials now only have to implement
some plan to desegregate.  They are excused from failing to
desegregate schools if they can point to some intervening cause
that made it too difficult for them to fashion an effective deseg-
regation plan.  In the aftermath of Dowell, school officials often
find cover by pointing to private choices by home buyers that
have led to residential segregation as an intervening force that
makes effective desegregation impossible and are consequently
permitted to operate racially segregated neighborhood
schools.113
The second way in which the Supreme Court decontextual-
ized race in its school desegregation jurisprudence was by ele-
vating local control over the mandate issued in Brown I to
provide students with desegregated education.  Stated differ-
ently, the Court in its more recent school desegregation juris-
prudence essentially found that returning school systems back
to the hands of local officials is a more important and pressing
goal than preventing the harms caused by racially segregated
schools.  As I noted in a prior work, “the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Brown I right of minority children to attend non-segre-
gated schools has arguably been subjugated to the American
value preference for ‘local control’ over schools.”114
For example, in Freeman v. Pitts,115 the Court allowed
schools to be released from federal court supervision in piece-
meal fashion, meaning that school systems can be declared
unitary in some aspects of the Green factors, but not others.116
ance with the desegregation plan’s requirements during this nine-year period is,
therefore, uncontested in this case.” (footnote omitted)).
113 See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960,
972 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that although a number of schools were racially
segregated, school officials desegregated schools to the extent practicable and
that “voluntary residential patterns have re-segregated a number of the core city’s
schools.”); Lee v. Autauga Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:70CV3098T (WO), 2005 WL
1868745, at *4 (M.D. Ala. July 19, 2005) (finding that school officials had met
their obligation to desegregate schools to the extent practicable even while noting
that the school system “enrolls approximately 8,800 students, 23% of whom are
African-American” while “[t]he student population enrolled at the Autaugaville
School is 98% African-American.”).
114 Wilson, supra note 30, at 644. R
115 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
116 See id. at 490 (“We hold that, in the course of supervising desegregation
plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of
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In doing so, the Court emphasized that the ultimate objective of
school desegregation litigation is to return school districts to
local control of local authorities.117  As other scholars have
remarked, the effect of Freeman was to effectively “reconstitu-
tionalize segregation because the decision exempted school
districts from ever instituting a complete remedy of the consti-
tutional violation.”118
Other key Supreme Court school desegregation cases have
also emphasized that principles of federalism necessitate that
federal supervision of local schools be a temporary measure
and that local control of schools be returned as soon as possi-
ble.119  The Supreme Court often takes such a position, while
simultaneously minimizing the relevance of local control re-
sulting in a return to racially segregated, racially identifiable
schools.120  Indeed, in its misguided decontextualization of the
significance of racially identifiable schools, the Supreme Court
even curtailed school districts’ ability to voluntarily implement
race-conscious school assignment plans that seek to desegre-
gate schools.121
The Court’s focus on local control comes at the cost of
allowing ongoing segregation in schools to persist, even when
school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in
every area of school operations.”).
117 Id. at 489.
118 Robinson, supra note 36, at 826; see also Wendy Parker, The Future of R
School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1169 (2000) (“Partial unitary status
greatly eases the burden on defendants because it allows piecemeal remedies over
a set period of time; the remedy need not be complete in redressing the remedy the
violation at one point in time.”).
119 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (“On remand, the
District Court must bear in mind that its end purpose is not only ‘to remedy the
violation’ to the extent practicable, but also ‘to restore state and local authorities
to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Consti-
tution.’” (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (“[F]ederal supervision of local school systems
was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.”); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education
is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local auton-
omy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational
process.”).
120 See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The mere fact
that a school is black does not mean that it is the product of a constitutional
violation.  A ‘racial imbalance does not itself establish a violation of the Constitu-
tion.’” (quoting United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas J.,
concurring)).
121 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (finding voluntary race conscious school assignment plans un-
constitutional and noting “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race”).
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school districts remain under some form of federal court super-
vision.  Indeed, an examination of active school desegregation
cases found that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on local con-
trol often results in district court judges affording undue defer-
ence to defendant school officials.122  Thus, even when school
districts are under federal court supervision, in the name of
local control, great deference is often afforded to defendant
school districts, which arguably results in lax enforcement of
ongoing school desegregation orders.123
In sum, the Supreme Court’s understanding of what it
means to return to racially identifiable schools is completely
divorced from the reality of the ways in which race functions in
America both as a historical marker of past injustices and,
more likely than not, as a present indicator of ongoing
marginalization and subordination.  As a result of this juris-
prudence, racial segregation in schools is not only legally nor-
malized but socially normalized as well.124  Few people voice
meaningful objections to racial segregation in schools; it is now
tacitly accepted as a way of life.125  As the following Part dem-
onstrates, the legal and social normalization of racial segrega-
tion in schools paved the way for municipal secessions from
Southern county-based school districts.  These secessions, in
turn, threaten to further resegregate schools in the South.
122 See Parker, supra note 25, at 1650. R
123 See id. at 1650–52 (arguing that district court judges grant school districts
wide latitude in controlling school desegregation cases and suggesting that many
district court judges “seem exhausted from their decades-long effort and anxious
to terminate their jurisdiction.”); Wilson, supra note 30, at 644 (“Because the R
Court has so freely embraced localism, defendant school districts have enjoyed
significant latitude to exercise control over the school desegregation remedial
process.”).
124 See John Charles Boger, Brown and the American South, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra note 61, at 305, 311 (noting a R
“drift away from integrated public schooling and [a] deeper loss of urgency about
integrated public institutions”).
125 See David L. Kirp, Making Schools Work, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/opinion/sunday/integration-worked-why-have-
we-rejected-it.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6JZQ-UYVG] (chronicling the
resegregation of schools in America and the declining interest in desegregation
remedies and noting that, “[t]o the current reformers, integration is at best an
irrelevance and at worst an excuse to shift attention away from shoddy teaching”);
cf. Nikole Hannah-Jones, The Problem We All Live With, THIS AM. LIFE (July 31,
2015), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/the-prob-
lem-we-all-live-with [http://perma.cc/85EZ-FY8E] (criticizing the abandonment
of school desegregation remedies and noting how effective school desegregation
was).
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II
A LEGAL AND FACTUAL ORIENTATION TO SOUTHERN
SCHOOL DISTRICT SECESSIONS
School districts in the South no longer face the exacting
desegregation scrutiny they once did, either because they were
released from federal court desegregation orders or because
enforcement of ongoing desegregation orders is deferential to
defendant school districts.126  Consequently, school districts in
the South are able to use state and local government laws to
restructure their school districts in ways that threaten to fur-
ther exacerbate the resegregation of schools in the South.  One
such tool that they are using is municipal secession from
county-based school districts that the Supreme Court in
Wright previously deemed unconstitutional.127
As a matter of law, a municipal secession is generally de-
fined as the process by which a territory detaches itself from
one established municipality and forms its own municipality or
joins another municipality.128  A municipal secession can also
take the form of a municipal incorporation insofar as it may
involve a “self-contained community with common interests
seek[ing] to establish itself as a separate entity.”129  Alterna-
tively, a municipal secession can take the form of a de-annexa-
tion in the sense that it can consist of a territory detaching
from one municipality and incorporating as a brand new mu-
nicipality.130  At its core, a municipal secession is essentially a
procedural mechanism that allows a territory to form new geo-
graphic boundary lines that have both legal and political
significance.
Using the aforementioned definition of municipal seces-
sion, this Part provides an in-depth analysis of Southern sub-
126 See supra subpart I.C.
127 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. R
128 See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Govern-
ance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-
Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 794 (1992) (noting that in a secession
people are determined to leave a jurisdiction and take their territory with them);
Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322, 327 (1991) (“A
right to secede implies not only the severance of political obligation but also a
valid claim to territory.”); Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentral-
ized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1412 (1997) (describing secession as local
governments “deannex[ing] themselves from larger communities”).
129 Joseph P. Viteritti, Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of Justifiable
Secession, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1995).
130 See, e.g., Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287, 288–90 (6th Cir. 1984)
(describing a township in Ohio that detached from Springfield and was annexed
by the city of Akron).
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urban municipal secessions from county-based school
districts.  It offers the first in-depth examination of municipal
secessions from school districts in the legal literature.131  In
subparts A and B, examples from two Southern counties, Jef-
ferson County, Alabama and East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisi-
ana, help to provide a factual orientation to the issues
presented by Southern school district secessions.132  Subpart
C concludes by locating school district secessions in the mu-
nicipal law on boundary changes and analyzes special legal
considerations that attend all municipal secessions, including
municipal secessions from school districts.
A. A Factual Orientation to School District Secessions:
Jefferson County, Alabama
In Alabama, the Jefferson County School District (JCSD)
provides a rich example of the complexities surrounding sub-
urban secessions from county-based school districts in the
South.  JCSD is the second-largest school district in the state
of Alabama.133  It contains fifty-five schools and serves thirty-
six thousand students from nearly every city or municipality
within Jefferson County.134
The state of Alabama in general, and the JCSD in particu-
lar, has a long and ignoble history of fiercely resisting school
desegregation.  In 1965, JCSD was sued and came under the
purview of a federal school desegregation order, yet resistance
to school desegregation in JCSD remained rampant and pro-
131 Other scholars in the field of education have examined this phenomenon,
but this section offers the first in-depth examination in the legal literature. See,
e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 8, at 887–903 (offering an analysis of school district R
splintering in Alabama); Murray, supra note 15, at 53–55 (2009) (examining the
nature and legitimacy of school district secessions).
132 These two secession examples represent two of many attempted or com-
pleted secessions from school districts by suburbs in the South.  For example,
suburbs in Pulaski County, Arkansas, Shelby County, Tennessee, and Montgom-
ery, Alabama, to name a few, have all successfully seceded from county-based
school districts. See Brantley, supra note 32; Denisa R. Superville, Memphis Area R
Starts Year with Six Breakaway Districts, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.
edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01brief-3.h34.html [https://perma.cc/
2M49-V6B7]; Rebecca Burylo, Pike Road School a ‘Catastrophic’ Hit to MPS
Budget, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.montgomeryadver
tiser.com/story/news/education/2015/09/09/pike-road-school-catastrophic-
hit-mps-budget/71964578/ [https://perma.cc/3NGR-QGD9].
133 Ten municipalities within Jefferson County have their own independent
school districts, and all other municipalities are served by JCSD. See CRAIG
POUNCEY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 2 (Nov. 14,
2014), www.advanc-ed.org/oasis2/u/par/accreditation/summary/pdf [http://
perma.cc/9FAQ-P87L].
134 Id.
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gress slow.135  Over the course of the last fifty years, plaintiffs
have brought claims alleging that JCSD was not in compliance
with several of the Green factors, including student assign-
ment, staffing, bussing, and the construction of new
schools.136  JCSD remains under a federal court desegregation
order today.137
Notwithstanding the active federal desegregation order,
several predominantly white suburbs in Jefferson County mu-
nicipalities have seceded from JCSD.138  This seeming anomaly
is possible for three reasons.  First, Alabama state law creates
very permissive rules that make it easy for school districts to
leave a county-based district and form their own district.139
Second, when municipalities have exercised their right under
Alabama state law to secede, they received virtually no resis-
tance from the Jefferson County Board of Education—even
though the Board has the authority to challenge the secessions
as violating the ongoing school desegregation order.140
Third, and most importantly, when the secessions first be-
gan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to
enjoin suburban municipalities from leaving the JCSD.141  In-
135 See Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 845 F.2d 1559, 1560 (11th Cir.
1988) (“The history of this litigation may be traced to 1965, when an action
seeking to desegregate the public schools of Jefferson County, Alabama, was filed
on behalf of a class of black schoolchildren.”).
136 See Kent Faulk, Federal Court Document Traces Early Years of 50-Year-Old
Desegregation Lawsuit Against Jefferson County Schools, AL.COM (Oct. 31, 2014),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/10/federal_court_docu
ment_traces.html [http://perma.cc/GCH7-V5WV].
137 See Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-cv-0396 (N.D. Ala. 1965).
138 See Frankenberg, supra note 8, at 875 (“Contrary to the earlier trend of R
school district consolidation across the United States, the number of school sys-
tems in Jefferson County, Alabama, has proliferated.”).
139 See infra subpart II.C.
140 Stout, No. 2:65-cv-0396 (N.D. Ala. 1965); Supplemental Report to the Court
Regarding Matters Related to the Formation of the Gardendale School System,
Stout, No. 2:65-cv-0396 (1965) (No. 1001) (filed Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Sup-
plemental Report] (noting that “[h]istorically, the County Board has not opposed
the approval of splinter districts” under the ongoing school desegregation order
but instead “the County Board has taken a neutral position in response to what
have largely been pro forma submissions”).
141 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Wright, the Fifth Circuit originally
required any suburban municipalities formed after the federal court school deseg-
regation decree to be included in the desegregation order. See Stout v. Jefferson
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that the Jefferson
County School desegregation decree should encompass the entire Jefferson
County School District as it stood at the time the desegregation order was entered
and noting that “where the formulation of splinter school districts, albeit validly
created under state law, have the effect of thwarting the implementation of a
unitary school system, the district court may not, consistent with the teachings of
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, recognize their creation” (citation omitted)).  The
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stead, the court applied a legal standard that is inconsistent
with Wright and allowed suburbs to operate school districts
separate and apart from the JCSD as long as they “accept[ed] a
proper role in the desegregation of the county[-based school
district] system.”142
Accepting “a proper role” in the county-based school sys-
tem desegregation efforts essentially amounted to the subur-
ban districts agreeing to federal court supervision as part of the
ongoing federal desegregation order, while at the same time
being permitted to operate a separate district.143  African-
American private plaintiffs initially challenged the secessions
as violating the ongoing desegregation order and sought relief
in the form of bussing as a remedy.144  However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit declined to order such a remedy, relying on the familiar
ahistorical refrain that segregation was caused by geographic
forces outside the remedial purview of the federal court
system.145
As a result of the lax Alabama state rules for secession and
the Fifth Circuit’s failure to enjoin the secessions, predomi-
nantly white suburbs in Jefferson County with the financial
and political wherewithal to secede are doing so.  In the last ten
years alone, two suburbs seceded from JCSD: the city of Truss-
ville seceded in 2005146 and the city of Gardendale in 2014.147
The Gardendale secession is finally being challenged by the
Jefferson County Board of Education on the grounds that it
would exacerbate segregation and violate the ongoing school
desegregation order.148  The issue is currently pending before
Fifth Circuit later reversed itself in Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d
1213, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 1972) and allowed the suburban municipalities to oper-
ate separate school systems apart from the Jefferson County School District.
142 Stout, 466 F.2d at 1214.
143 See Frankenberg, supra note 8, at 885. R
144 See Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 1976).
145 Id. at 801–02 (finding that bussing between two schools would require
crossing a substantial chain of hills or small mountains on dangerous and heavily
traveled roads and declining to order bussing as a remedy despite the existence of
two all-black schools and one all-white school).
146 See Frankenberg, supra note 8, at 886. R
147 See Madison Underwood, Gardendale School System Split Dispute Will Be
Handled in Federal Court, AL.COM (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/
birmingham/index.ssf/2015/03/gardendale_school_system_split.html [http://
perma.cc/55QS-42CC] (describing Gardendale’s proposed split from the JCSD
and the legal issues that need to be worked out before the split can occur).
148 See Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 7.  Notably, the JCSD Board of R
Education concedes that its failure to contest previous secessions has resulted in
a slow grade exit of predominately white municipalities out of JCSD and that the
Gardendale secession threatens to be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s
back. See id. at 15.
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the district court judge overseeing the ongoing federal desegre-
gation order.149
In making the decision to secede, residents and policymak-
ers in both Gardendale and Trussville cited three primary
goals: (i) obtaining municipal local control of schools so that
the schools can reflect the needs and desires of their communi-
ties; (ii) increasing efficiency by creating smaller sized school
districts; and (iii) bringing more businesses and employers to
Jefferson County by increasing the quality of the schools.150
Some proponents also wish to distance themselves from a fi-
nancially failing county (the Jefferson County municipal gov-
ernment filed for bankruptcy in November of 2011) and an
academically struggling county-based school system.151  To
that end, residents in both Gardendale and Trussville agreed to
raise taxes on themselves in order to finance their new inde-
pendent school districts.152
The suburban secessions from JCSD highlight two critical
issues related to school desegregation that have not previously
been explored in the legal literature: student assignment and
school facilities.  With respect to student assignment, under
Alabama law, when a secession occurs, the new school district
is permitted to draw new boundary lines that track municipal-
149 See id. at 15–16.
150 GARDENDALE BD. OF EDUC., GARDENDALE CITY SCHOOLS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 1, http://images.pcmac.org/Uploads/GardendaleCS/GardendaleCS/
Sites/DocumentsCategories/Documents/FAQs-Gardendale-revamped%282
%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVQ7-7EC3] (noting that the Gardendale school sys-
tem was created because “[i]t is the intent of the Gardendale Board of Education
and Administration to have the ability to focus specifically on what matters to the
parents and students in the Gardendale area: academics and curriculum, diverse
course offerings, achievement in athletics and in the arts, as well as community
service and civic participation.  Ultimately, this is about Gardendale having more
local control, and access to greater resources which will directly benefit our chil-
dren.  And we believe this will encourage young families to move into
Gardendale”); Tiffany Ray, School Districts May Fuel New Segregation, AL.COM
(Dec. 13, 2009), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2009/12/school_districts_
may_fuel_new.html [http://perma.cc/9FX7-JHSB] (quoting the mayor of the city
of Trussville as stating that the separation from the Jefferson County School
District had nothing to do with race but was instead rooted in a desire to provide
high quality education to children who are residents of Trussville and to obtain
more local control over public education for Trussville students).
151 See generally Martin Z. Braun, Darrell Preston & Liz Willen, The Banks
That Fleeced Alabama, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Sept. 2005), at 52, http://www.mobile
baytimes.com/alabama.pdf [http://perma.cc/JD5M-E9UT] (describing how fi-
nancial mismanagement led to Jefferson County filing bankruptcy and its impact
on the Jefferson County schools).
152 See Ray, supra note 150; Newkirk, supra note 1. R
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ity boundary lines.153  The newly created district can, but is not
required to, permit students who live outside the boundaries to
attend their schools.154  When the newly created districts draw
their district boundary lines to match municipal boundary
lines, the demographics of the new districts look very different
than the demographics of the county-based district.
For example, the JCSD demographics are relatively diverse
at 46% white, 45% Black, 6% Hispanic, and 57%
socioeconomically disadvantaged.155  However, the city of
Gardendale’s demographics are considerably less diverse at
88% white, 8% Black, 1% Asian, 1% Latino, and only 4.8%
socioeconomically disadvantaged.156  If Gardendale exercises
its legal right to draw new boundary lines so that they track
municipal boundary lines, the school district will likely closely
replicate the demographics of the broader Gardendale munici-
pality, resulting in the creation of a predominately white and
middle-class school district.157
JCSD will also lose a significant number of white students,
thereby increasing racial segregation in JCSD.  Further, it is
possible that many of the students who lived outside of
Gardendale but previously attended schools in Gardendale
may no longer be permitted to attend those schools and might
have to be assigned to new schools.158  Indeed, approximately
3,000 students now attend schools in Gardendale, 2,300 of
whom live inside the city of Gardendale and 700 of whom live in
neighboring cities or unincorporated areas outside of the city of
153 See ALA. CODE § 16-13-199 (1975) (“[C]ontrol of the school or schools of the
territory within the municipality shall be vested in a city board of education . . . .”);
see also Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 20–21 (describing the school R
district boundary line changes that would occur if Gardendale is permitted to
secede).
154 See Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 22–23.
155 See A+ EDUC. P’SHIP, ALABAMA PUBLIC EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 5 (2014), http:/
/www.aplusala.org/uploadedFiles/File/A_AtaGlance_Flip_Book_for_Web.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RP6G-6SVK].
156 See “Quick Facts: Gardendale City, Alabama,” UNITED STATES CENSUS BU-
REAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01/0129056.html [http://
perma.cc/NA6X-ZUSL].
157 Indeed, Trussville School District, which seceded in 2005, chose that ap-
proach.  Trussville now has a very small student body at 4,000 students and a
demographic profile that is 85% white, 10% Black, 1% Hispanic and 4% catego-
rized as “other.” See A+ EDUC. P’SHIP, supra note 155, at 8; About TCS, TRUSSVILLE R
CITY SCHS., http://www.trussvillecityschools.com/?PN=AboutUs [https://
perma.cc/M22F-6CVF].
158 Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 20 (describing the impact of the R
Gardendale secession on students who attend schools located in Gardendale but
live outside of Gardendale).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-NOV-16 13:19
170 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:139
Gardendale.159  Gardendale has indicated some willingness to
allow students who live outside of Gardendale in predominately
black unincorporated territories to attend schools within the
new Gardendale school system on a permanent basis in order
to quell concerns about the segregative effects of their depar-
ture from the Jefferson County School System.160  Yet ques-
tions remain as to the effects of the segregation on the
Jefferson County School System, as both the Department of
Justice and the Jefferson County School Board remain op-
posed to the secession.161  This student assignment issue—
particularly the potential for race and class imbalances be-
tween the new and old districts, and displacement of stu-
dents—occurs in nearly all Southern municipal secessions
from county-based school districts.162
Additionally, with respect to facilities, when municipalities
secede from school districts, they often take with them the
physical school buildings that are located within the attend-
ance zone associated with the municipality.  Gardendale is
seeking to take with it all elementary, middle, and high school
buildings located in the city of Gardendale,163 including a new
$46 million state high school that was funded by a special
school construction tax paid for by all residents of Jefferson
County.164  A question that emerges is what responsibility, if
159 See Kent Faulk, Brookside, Graysville Ask Court to Block Gardendale Re-
quest to Form School System, AL.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.al.com/news/
birmingham/index.ssf/2016/04/brookside_graysville_ask_court.html [https://
perma.cc/8UEZ-UNTZ].
160 See Kent Faulk, Gardendale’s New School System Would Include North
Smithfield Students Outside the City, AL.COM (Apr. 05, 2016), http://www.al.com/
news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/12/gardendales_new_school_system.html
[https://perma.cc/TB9F-F9AN].
161 See Kent Faulk, DOJ Opposes Gardendale Split from Jefferson County
Schools; Federal Judge to Have Last Word, AL.COM (June 28, 2016), http://www.
al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/06/doj_opposes_gardendale_split_
f.html [https://perma.cc/HQ6C-5CF6].
162 See, e.g., Brantley, supra note 32 (describing the racial segregation that R
will occur as a result of municipal secessions from school districts in Arkansas);
Municipality Split, CHALKBEAT, http://tn.chalkbeat.org/topics/municipality-split/
[http://perma.cc/TZ6Q-K8U7] (describing municipal secessions from the Shelby
County School District and noting that “Shelby County and the city of Memphis
. . . brought lawsuits alleging that the creation of the new municipal districts was
racially motivated, violating the law.”).
163 See Faulk, supra note 160. R
164 See Madison Underwood, Gardendale Will Learn This Week How Much It
Must Pay to Split from Jefferson County Schools, AL.COM (Feb. 22, 2015), http://
www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/02/gardendale_will_learn_to
morrow.html [http://perma.cc/E78Q-ER3Y] (describing the facilities issues asso-
ciated with the Gardendale secession and noting that the Jefferson County Com-
mission approved a one-cent county-wide sales tax to fund $1 billion dollars’
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any, Gardendale has to compensate JCSD for the buildings it
takes with it.  To date, Gardendale has taken the position that
the compensation should be minimal.165
JCSD however contends that the students remaining in
JCSD are entitled to enjoy the same or equivalent facilities that
would have been available to them but for the city system’s
separation from the county, particularly in light of the fact that
county taxes were used to upgrade the Gardendale school facil-
ities.166  The issue is also being decided by the Alabama federal
court overseeing the desegregation order.167  Nonetheless, the
aforementioned issues related to school assignment and school
facilities provide a window into the equity issues that are often
at play whenever there is a school district secession.  As de-
scribed in the subpart that follows, municipal secessions from
county-based schools can also raise issues of financial parity
and hyper-racial segregation as well.
B. A Factual Orientation to School District Secessions:
East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana
The school system in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana,
is also experiencing high numbers of suburban municipal se-
cessions.  East Baton Rouge Parish consists of four cities: Ba-
ton Rouge, Baker, Central, and Zachary.168  It also includes a
large tract of unincorporated territory known as St. George.169
Baker, Central, and Zachary were at onetime part of the East
Baton Rouge Parish School System (EBRPSS) but seceded and
formed their own independent school districts.170  As a result,
worth of school construction and that the Jefferson County Board of Education
chose to use $46 million dollars of the money it received from the Commission to
build a new state of the art high school in Gardendale).
165 Gardendale is offering to pay approximately $8 million dollars in costs and
to enact a transition plan that allows students who currently reside within JCSD’s
attendance zone for Gardendale to continue attending Gardendale schools
through graduation. See Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 5, 8. R
166 See id. at 25.
167 See Robert Carter, Federal Judge Puts Brakes on Gardendale Schools’ Law-
suit Against JefCoEd; Hearing Set for Tuesday, N. JEFFERSON NEWS (Mar. 18,
2015), http://www.njeffersonnews.com/news/federal-judge-puts-brakes-on-
gardendale-schools-lawsuit-against-jefcoed/article_e29c361c-cded-11e4-9107-
4fd2ad909d8c.html [http://perma.cc/6QKL-J2UM].
168 See JAMES RICHARDSON, JARED LLORENS & ROY HEIDELBERG, BRAC White Pa-
per: On the Possibility of a New City in East Baton Rouge Parish 1 (Dec. 7, 2013),
http://brac.org/docs/pdf/brac_white_paper_new_city_ebr.pdf [http://perma.cc
/MLL9-MFF6].
169 See id. at 1, 3.
170 Id. at 1.
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the EBRPSS now only contains the City of Baton Rouge and the
large tract of unincorporated land known as St. George.171
Further, like many school systems in the South, EBRPSS
also has a long ignoble history of resisting school desegrega-
tion.  Black plaintiffs filed suit in order to force EBRPSS to
comply with Brown I in 1956.172 The lawsuit was at one point
the longest-running school desegregation case in the country,
but the case settled in 2003 and the district court released
EBRPSS from federal court supervision in 2007.173
It is against this backdrop that residents of the unincorpo-
rated territory of St. George are making a serious and sus-
tained effort to secede.174  Proponents of the St. George
secession essentially rely upon the same three rationales for
secession as the JCSD proponents of secession: a desire for
increased municipal local control over schools, enhanced effi-
ciency because of the smaller size of the school district, and the
likelihood that a higher-quality school district will attract desir-
able businesses and residents.175  The potential secession by
St. George highlights two critical but different issues than
those raised by the JCSD secessions: (i) the possibility of creat-
ing a hypersegregated county-based school district, defined as
a school where a supermajority of the students are minori-
ties;176 and (ii) the adverse financial ramifications for the
county-based school district from which secession is
sought.177
With respect to the issue of hypersegregation, students in
the new St. George district would be 70% white, 23% Black,
171 See id. (“[T]he East Baton Rouge Parish School System provid[es] public
education for families living in the City of Baton Rouge and in unincorporated
areas of the parish.”).
172 See Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 214 F. Supp. 624, 625 (E.D. La.
1963).
173 See COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, LOUISIANA DESEGREGATION CASE
STUDIES: EAST BATON ROUGE, WEST CARROLL, AND TANGIPAHOA 3 (2010), http://
www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Louisiana-Desegrega
tion-Case-Studies.pdf [https://perma.cc/A35X-48MU].
174 See FAQ’s, ST. GEORGE, LA., http://www.stgeorgelouisiana.com/about/
faqs [http://perma.cc/HKY4-E7SQ].
175 See id.
176 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 25–26 (2010) (defin-
ing hypersegregation in terms of the dissimilarity index and noting that demogra-
phers consider a dissimilarity index over sixty to indicate high or hyper
segregation, and also noting the hypersegregation of public schools); GARY ORFIELD
& SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF Brown v.
Board of Education 359 (1996) (highlighting the drastic negative consequences of
hypersegregation).
177 RICHARDSON, LLORENS & HEIDELBERG, supra note 168, at 11–14. R
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and 4% Asian, with a mean family income of $94,824.178  Stu-
dents residing within the EBRPSS boundary lines by contrast
would be 55% Black, 40% white, and 3% Asian, with a mean
family income of $68,958.179  However, a large percentage of
white students residing within EBRPSS currently opt out of the
public school system and attend private school.180  Only 10%
of the students who now attend EBRPSS schools are white,
while 80% are Black.181  Thus, decreasing the percentage of
white students even eligible to attend school within the system
would likely also decrease the already small percentage of
white students who attend EBRPSS schools.  This would in
turn elevate the potential for increasing hypersegregation
within the EBRPSS.
Further, there would be significant financial consequences
for EBRPSS if St. George secedes.  The new city of St. George
“would be one of the wealthiest cities in the state.”182  Impor-
tantly, the boundary lines for the new proposed city of St.
George contain a number of major retail centers.183  The sales
taxes generated by those retail centers make up a significant
portion of the tax base that is used to fund schools within the
EBRPSS.184  The St. George secession would mean that the
EBRPSS would lose the tax revenue generated by retail centers
in St. George to fund EBRPSS schools.185  Instead, that tax
revenue would all go to the new St. George School District.186
Lastly, in addition to losing tax revenue, if St. George suc-
cessfully secedes, the EBRPSS may be solely responsible for
paying what are known as district “legacy costs.”  These are
ongoing legally obligated payments for things such as employee
retirement that the county-based district is required to con-
tinue paying.187  As a result of the legacy costs and the loss of
sales tax revenue from its tax base, economists predict that the
178 Id. at 4, 25.
179 Id.
180 See Diana Samuels, New Orleans Has Highest Percentage of Private School
Students, Baton Rouge Is 4th, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nola
.com/education/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/08/new_orleans_has_highest_
percen.html [https://perma.cc/JQ29-XKVP].
181 East Baton Rouge Parish School System, Louisiana, NAT’L COUNCIL ON TCHR.
QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/districtPolicy/contractDatabase/district.do?id=75
[https://perma.cc/G9SQ-7ZS6].
182 RICHARDSON, LLORENS & HEIDELBERG, supra note 168, at 5. R
183 Id. at 19.
184 Id. at 25 (noting that revenues from sales taxes in the high sales taxes
generating part of the parish would no longer be available to the EBRPSS).
185 Id. at 24–25.
186 Id.
187 RICHARDSON & HEIDELBERG, supra note 6, at 9. R
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amount of revenue per pupil that EBRPSS would have available
to spend would decrease from $9,635 per student to $8,870.188
In contrast, they predict that the per pupil revenue available for
students in the new St. George school system would be
$11,686.189
All in all, the secession efforts in both Jefferson County,
Alabama and East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana provide a
window into the racial, socioeconomic, revenue, and school
financial consequences that attend the school district seces-
sions.  Proponents of the secessions suggest that the seces-
sions are warranted due to the municipal local control of
schools, alleged efficiency gains, and increased quality of edu-
cation for the seceding school districts that they can use to
recruit businesses and residents.
However, any benefits of the secessions must be consid-
ered in context with the racial and class differences between
new and old districts, along with the potentially adverse finan-
cial consequences for the districts left behind after the seces-
sion.  As discussed in subpart C, each individual state has
plenary authority to allow (or disallow) school district seces-
sions.  The legal framework that states establish with respect to
secessions can play a tremendous role in either facilitating or
circumscribing school district secessions.
C. Locating School District Secessions Within the Law on
Municipal Boundary Changes
As a matter of conventional state and local government
law, in the absence of discrimination or other conditions that
violate the federal Constitution,190 the legislature in each state
has plenary power to determine whether a territory can secede
from a municipality and, if so, what the process for secession
will entail.191  Further, the state also has the power to create or
188 RICHARDSON, LLORENS & HEIDELBERG, supra note 168, at 25–26. R
189 Id. at 26.
190 See, e.g., Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 477 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (“The
Constitution of the United States enacts neither principles of consolidated metro-
politan government nor those of decentralized government in villages and small
towns.  It is silent on these subjects.  It grants the federal courts no power to
construct solutions to urban blight or suburban sprawl, or to invalidate solutions
reached by a state, if racial discrimination or some other unconstitutional factor
is not involved.” (footnote omitted)).
191 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“In the
absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities
have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control
of the state.”); Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 2024 (2013)
(finding that under U.S. law “municipalities have no vested rights in their bounda-
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alter the boundary lines of all local governments, including
school districts.192  Thus, states also have plenary power to
decide when and under what conditions to allow a municipality
to secede from a school district.193  Two important legal issues
are relevant to school district secessions: home rule and voting
rights.  Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
1. Home Rule
One issue that potentially presents a limit to the plenary
power that states have over municipal secessions is the con-
cept of home rule.  Home rule authority gives local govern-
ments the ability to act without first obtaining permission from
their state legislature.194  More specifically, it gives local gov-
ernments a range of authority to deal with inherently local
matters that do not infringe upon state laws or policies.195
Though the issue of whether or not a territory should be per-
mitted to secede is arguably an “inherently local matter,” many
courts have found that home rule authority does not change
the plenary authority afforded to states over municipal bound-
ary line changes, including secessions.196  Thus, as other local
ries” and that most states only allow for “unilateral secession [in] very particular
circumstances”).
192 See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“The
state, therefore, at its pleasure, may . . . expand or contract the territorial area,
unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and
destroy the corporation.”); Gragg v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 287, 627 P.2d 335, 338
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (“A school district is an arm of the state existing only as a
creature of the legislature to operate as a political subdivision of the state.  A
school district has only such power and authority as is granted by the legisla-
ture . . . .” (quoting Wichita Pub. Sch. Emps. Union v. Smith, 397 P.2d 357 (Kan.
1964))); Town of Lisbon v. Lisbon Vill. Dist., 183 A.2d 250, 253 (N.H. 1962)
(finding that state legislatures have the power to create local governments and
also to “modify or divide them in such manner as to meet the public exigencies”).
193 See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-2-502(b)(3) (2013) (removing the restric-
tions in the Tennessee law on school district creation and allowing any locality
that is part of a county district that was subject to a unilateral merger to secede
and form a new school district); Norton v. Lakeside Special Sch. Dist., 133 S.W.
184, 185 (Ark. 1910) (“The [l]egislature is primarily vested with the power to create
school districts, and it may create or abolish a school district, or change the
boundaries of those established for any reason that may be satisfactory to it.”).
194 Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home
Rule, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1990 (2006) (“[I]n a home rule state, local governments
have authority to act on matters of local concern unless a state statute preempts
local action; in a non-home rule state, local governments may act on a matter only
if a state statute authorizes local action.”).
195 See id.
196 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (re-
marking that the Hunter v. Pittsburgh case “continues to have substantial consti-
tutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States
have in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority
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government law scholars have suggested, “[m]ost state courts
treat municipal boundaries as interlocal matters, outside the
scope of home rule immunity.”197  Further, most school dis-
tricts do not have home rule authority, so the state most cer-
tainly has plenary power over municipal secessions from
school districts.198  For those reasons, home rule typically does
not in any way limit the considerable power that states have in
shaping the landscape for Southern municipal secessions from
county-based school districts.
2. Voting Rights
Once a state gives a municipality the authority to secede,
some states require a voter referendum in order for the seces-
sion to proceed.199  A key question in states that require a voter
referendum is which residents have the right to vote: the re-
sidents in the seceding territory only or both the residents in
the seceding territory and the residents in the territory from
which secession is sought.  Constitutional interests attach and
may be infringed upon when the state gives the right to vote to
some residents but not to others.200
The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to any restric-
tion on voting that denies the right to vote to a person regarding
a matter that substantially impacts that person.201  Certainly,
upon them”); In re Town of E. Hampton v. New York, 263 A.D.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (finding that home rule amendment did not require the state legislature
to enact general mechanism for the creation of new counties); City of New York v.
New York, 158 A.D.2d 169, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), aff’d by 562 N.E.2d 118
(N.Y. 1990) (“Legislation dealing with matters of State concern, albeit of localized
application and having a direct effect on the most basic of local interests, does not
violate the Constitution’s home rule provisions.”); see generally George D. Vaubel,
Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home
Rule, 20 STETSON L. REV. 5, 9–10 (1990) (noting that as a general rule home rule
authority has not changed the plenary authority that states have over municipal
boundaries).
197 Briffault, supra note 128, at 810. R
198 See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform,
24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 780 (1992) (“Home rule is rarely, if ever, extended to special
districts, such as school districts.”).
199 See Briffault, supra note 128, at 791–92. R
200 Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430
U.S. 259, 264–65 (1977).
201 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
(“Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives.  Therefore, if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship
and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclu-
sions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” (footnote omitted));
Herriman City v. Swensen, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (D. Utah 2007) (same).
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the secession of a territory has a substantial effect on both the
residents who are seceding and the residents who reside in the
territory from which secession is sought.  Given that logic, it
would seem that limiting the right to vote to only one class of
residents affected by secession (e.g., those attempting to se-
cede) might violate the 14th Amendment, in the absence of a
compelling state interest for doing so.  Yet, the Supreme Court
has held that “the protection of the right to vote . . . only
extends within a political jurisdiction.”202  The Court has fur-
ther held that states have broad authority to determine which
voters get to vote in elections that impact local boundary
lines.203  Thus, limiting the right to vote in a secession referen-
dum to only residents of the locality attempting to secede does
not violate the 14th Amendment.204  Indeed, when such limita-
tions have been challenged in the context of municipal seces-
sions from school districts, courts have found them
constitutional.205
In sum, states have plenary power to set the legal parame-
ters for school district secessions.  They can use that power to
create a landscape that allows for the proliferation or circum-
scription of school district secessions.  For example, under Ala-
bama law, any municipality with more than five thousand
residents is permitted to form their own school district.206  The
only requirements for doing so are that the city wishing to
secede: (i) create a school board;207 and (ii) negotiate an agree-
ment regarding the financials related to the split and school
facilities.208  A consequence of the relatively lenient require-
ments under Alabama law for forming a new school district has
resulted in a bevy of secessions in JCSD and other parts of the
state.209  In contrast, the requirements for forming a new
school district under Louisiana law are much more taxing.
202 Briffault, supra note 128, at 793; see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, R
343–44 (1972) (“An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of
bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a politi-
cal community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.”).
203 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68 (1978) (uphold-
ing differential treatment of residents outside of “the geographic boundaries of the
governmental entity concerned”); Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 272–73 (citing
“substantially differing electoral interests” as sufficient justification for differen-
tial treatment of voters).
204 See Briffault, supra note 128, at 791–93. R
205 E.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838 P.2d
1198, 1211 (Cal. 1992).
206 ALA. CODE § 16-11-1 (1975).
207 See ALA. CODE § 16-11-2 (1975).
208 See ALA. CODE § 16-8-20 (1975).
209 See supra subpart II.A.
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Under Louisiana law, only the state legislature can approve the
creation and funding of a school district.210  Two bills were put
through the Louisiana state legislature that would have al-
lowed for the creation and funding of a St. George School Dis-
trict but the legislative efforts were not successful.211  Efforts to
create a separate St. George school system are ongoing but to
date have also not been successful, largely because of the oner-
ous state requirements for creating a new school district.212
Importantly, a key component in how states use the ple-
nary power they have is often inextricably tied to state legisla-
tures’ views on the most effective forms of governance,
particularly whether they prefer centralized or decentralized
governance structures.213  State legislatures that exhibit a
preference for localism and decentralized governance struc-
tures are more likely to create a legal landscape that favors
school district secessions.214  The Part that follows examines
how the preference for localism plays out in the context of
suburban municipal secessions from school districts in the
South.
210 LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (“The legislature shall create parish school boards
and provide for the election of their members.”)
211 See Senate Bill 199, Regular Session (La. 2013), http://www.legis.la.gov/
legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=222589 [https://perma.cc/HH22-MSHP] (establishing the
creation of a new St. George school system); Senate Bill 73, Regular Session (La.
2013), http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=222163 [https://perma.cc/
57LB-2X46] (proposing funding for the St. George school system, which was un-
successful); see also Diana Samuels, East Baton Rouge, St. George Bills Turn Out
to Be Much Ado, With No Results, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 2, 2014), http://www.
nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/06/east_baton_rouge_st_george
_bil.html [https://perma.cc/AL9Z-UQRZ] (chronicling the failed legislative at-
tempts to create and fund an autonomous St. George school system).
212 Those efforts even included an attempt to incorporate St. George into its
own independent municipality with the hope that it would be easier politically to
establish a new school system if St. George became an autonomous municipality.
Yet the St. George incorporation effort failed. See Diana Samuels, St. George
Petition Comes Up Short by 71 Signatures; Campaign Says ‘This Is Far from Over,’
TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 13, 2015), http://www.nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.
ssf/2015/06/st_george_petition_comes_up_sh.html [https://perma.cc/VQ2R-
GKFV] (describing the shortcomings of St. George’s efforts to incorporate as a city
and noting that the impetus for the incorporation efforts were that “St. George
supporters felt disenfranchised by their local government, and that there were no
suitable options for public schools for their families in East Baton Rouge Parish”).
213 See Briffault, supra note 128, at 802–03 (discussing how the preference for R
centralized instead of decentralized governance structures influences the legal
rules that are put in place regarding municipal secessions).
214 See id.
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III
LOCALISM AND SCHOOL DISTRICT SECESSIONS
At their core, Southern municipal school district seces-
sions are premised upon the belief that decentralized systems
of school governance are preferable to the more centralized
county-based systems of school governance.215  They also re-
flect an ardent belief that local municipalities should have legal
and political autonomy over schools.  Such calls for municipal
autonomy over schools are undoubtedly connected to a
broader theory of governance called localism.  Indeed, as dis-
cussed in subpart I.D, the Supreme Court’s embrace of local
control essentially elevated localism in education to a constitu-
tional norm that is more highly valued than the ability of stu-
dents to attend a nonsegregated school.  Southern municipal
secessions threaten to serve as the proverbial nail in the coffin
for students’ ability to attend nonsegregated racially schools, at
least in the South.
This Part locates the Southern municipal school district
secessions in the state and local government law literature on
localism.  It introduces two different forms of localism: classic
localism and defensive localism.  It examines the theoretical
underpinnings of classic localism and suggests that, as both a
theoretical and practical matter, Southern municipal school
district secessions do not truly evince the benefits of classic
localism.  It concludes by analyzing the tenets of defensive lo-
calism and suggesting that Southern school district secessions
more closely resemble defensive localism.
A. Classic Localism and Its Theoretical Underpinnings
Localism is broadly defined as an ideological preference for
decentralized, independent local government structures.216  It
is a theory of governance that advocates for the “legal and
political empowerment of local areas.”217  Traditionally, the
term “local areas” is conceptualized as meaning the lowest level
of local government, namely the city or municipality.218  Local-
ism advocates that local areas should be afforded plenary legal
215 See supra subparts II.A–II.B.
216 Cashin, supra note 30, at 1988; Wilson, supra note 30, at 630. R
217 Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
218 See id. at 1–2 (noting that localism contemplates that autonomy and power
should be afforded to a relatively large number of small cities or municipalities);
cf. Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1329–30 (2014) (arguing
that a new form of localism called micro-localism supports decentralizing power
down to levels even lower than the municipality, such as the neighborhood or
school board).
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and political rights so that they can be completely autono-
mous.219  This Article refers to this form of localism as “classic
localism.”
The roots of classic localism lie in Jeffersonian conceptions
of democracy.  Thomas Jefferson’s vision was that of a decen-
tralized, agrarian republic consisting of federal, state, county,
and local ward governments.220  He argued that the local ward
government must be the lifeblood of the democracy.221  He
warned that each local ward should be small—five square miles
or less—so that sovereignty can lie with individual citizens who
could act directly and personally toward their own best inter-
ests.222  Decentralizing power down to the local ward of govern-
ment was in Jefferson’s view an ideal way to guard against
excessive abuses of state and/or federal power.223  Accord-
ingly, one of the central tenets of classic localism is that the
provision of government services should be subject primarily to
the control of local governments with the interests of local re-
sidents as the central focus of policy decision makers.224
Classic localism is the antithesis of a centralized system of
governance.  In a centralized system of governance, power and
decision making are concentrated within the realm of a central
body, and smaller localities are subject to the authority of that
central body.225  Using that definition, a county-based system
of school governance is considered a centralized system be-
cause individual municipalities within the county are subject
to the decisions and power asserted by the county-based
school district.
Proponents of classic localism suggest that a centralized
system of governance is inefficient, disempowers citizens, and
incentivizes them not to participate in the democracy.226  Con-
219 See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (arguing that a theory of localism
allows local governments to have “considerable autonomy over matters of local
concern”).
220 ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
3–4 (1966).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 38–40.
223 Id.
224 Wilson, supra note 30, at 630–31. R
225 See Briffault, supra note 217, at 1–7 (describing localism as being in oppo- R
sition to centralized forms of governance such as regionalism).  County-based
school districts provide an example of centralized governance systems insofar as
individual cities or municipalities within the county are subject to the authority of
the county for purposes of school governance.
226 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31, 37
(2000) (“[T]here is no reason to identify centralization with the ability to solve
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versely, in line with the Jeffersonian vision of an ideal demo-
cratic governance structure, localism is promoted on the
grounds that “smaller government provides a better context in
which to cultivate citizens and nurture a sense of commu-
nity.”227  Further, classic localism is widely touted as being
beneficial on the grounds that it: (i) promotes efficiency in the
provision of public goods, (ii) fosters democratic ideals, particu-
larly citizen participation, and (iii) cultivates a better sense of
community by allowing for autonomy and self-determination
by locally defined territorial communities.228  Each of these
tenets of classic localism is further fleshed out in the
paragraphs that follow.
The efficiency rationale for localism tracks Charles Tie-
bout’s Theory of Local Expenditures.229  In line with Tiebout’s
theory, localism is said to promote efficiency by providing citi-
zens with a diverse set of small local governments from which
to choose.230  The sheer number of local governments in close
proximity to one another allows citizens to vote with their feet
and move to a locality that offers a mix of public services that
best suits their needs.231  The proliferation of local govern-
ments also purportedly creates competition between local gov-
ernments for residents.232  The competition in turn incentivizes
local governments to offer the best possible set of public ser-
vices to citizens in order to attract and maintain a desirable
base of citizens.233  The interlocal competition for residents os-
tensibly ensures that local governments will remain efficient
because if they do not, they will lose citizens to neighboring
inter-jurisdictional problems and decentralization with the protection of local self-
ishness.  Historically, centralization has been a major contributor to the promo-
tion of local selfishness, and the conventional definition of federalism is simply the
most familiar attempt to recognize that entities that exercise decentralized power
can together form an indivisible union.”).
227 Cashin, supra note 90, at 753. R
228 Cashin, supra note 30, at 1998 (“[T]he values of democratic participation, R
efficiency, and community undergird an entrenched predisposition toward local-
ized authority among local government scholars, judges, and legislatures.”).
229 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 416–18 (1956).
230 Cashin, supra note 30, at 2000. R
231 Briffault, supra note 217, at 15 (“Decentralization allows local governments R
to tailor services, regulation and taxation to the needs and desires of their particu-
lar constitutents.”).
232 See Tiebout, supra note 229, at 417. R
233 See Cashin, supra note 30, at 2000 (“[L]ocal governance is preferable to R
centralized government: the greater the number of localities and the greater the
variation among them, the greater the likelihood that a ‘consumer-voter’ will find
a locality meeting his or her preferences.”).
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jurisdictions.234  Importantly, the efficiency rationale assumes
that localities bear the costs of their actions and that the only
people impacted by the localities’ decisions are the citizens who
reside within the locality.235
In addition to promoting efficiency, classic localism is also
believed to further democratic ideals by providing citizens with
a meaningful opportunity to participate in the political pro-
cess.236  Localism purportedly increases citizen participation
because the small size of local governments affords people op-
portunity for the exercise of genuine power and decision mak-
ing.237  This, in turn, creates more of an incentive for citizens to
participate in their own governance.238
Finally, classic localism is also strongly defended on the
grounds that it cultivates a sense of community amongst re-
sidents.239  The community-building function purportedly de-
rives from the collective choices of like-minded individuals to
reside in a particular locality.240  Indeed, classic localism is
said to allow “groups of people with shared concerns and val-
ues—distinct from those of the surrounding world” to come
together.241  Such like-minded individuals are theorized as be-
ing more cohesive, more likely to participate in their own gov-
ernance, and therefore more likely to embody certain positive
democratic ideals.242
For these reasons, classic localism as manifested through
large-scale decentralization of power to a large number of small
234 Briffault, supra note 217, at 16 (“The resulting interlocal competition R
checks local taxing, spending, and administrative inefficiency.”).
235 See Tiebout, supra note 229, at 419 (noting that local governments will be R
efficient only when there are “no external economies or diseconomies between
communities”).
236 Cashin, supra note 30, at 1998–2000. R
237 Id. at 1999.
238 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070
(1980) (“No one is likely to participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any
size unless that participation will make a difference in his life.  Power and partici-
pation are inextricably linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy
rather than participation, while the existence of power encourages those able to
participate in its exercise to do so.”).
239 Cashin, supra note 30, at 2001–02; Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective R
Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 622 (1997)
(“[L]ocal governments, through the existence of choice, allow for the fullest expres-
sion of self.”).
240 Poindexter, supra note 239, at 622 (“[T]he community is but a reflection of R
its residents’ individualities.”).
241 Briffault, supra note 217, at 17. R
242 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 445 (1990) (“Local borders, once created, reinforce local
identification, become a focus of sentiment and symbolism and create a powerful
legal bulwark for the preservation of local interests.”).
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cities or municipalities is viewed by some scholars and policy-
makers alike as a preferable form of governance.243  While criti-
cisms of classic localism certainly exist,244 classic localism is
still romanticized by some scholars as being the paradigmatic
model for state and local government relations.245  Indeed, the
proponents of school district secessions advance classic local-
ism-related reasons for favoring secession.246  Yet, as dis-
cussed in the subpart that follows, the tenets of classic
localism, particularly the efficiency and community tenets,
often do not necessarily ensue from the secessions.
B. The Limits of Classic Localism and School District
Secession
Classic localism is a highly regarded value in public educa-
tion.247  In the public education context, it plays out to mean
that although states are responsible for providing education,
the actual legal and political authority to provide public educa-
tion is decentralized down to local governments known as
school districts.248  In keeping with the tenets of classic local-
ism, school districts are afforded wide legal and political discre-
tion to govern schools.249  Further, also in keeping with the
tenets of classic localism, school districts are seen as further-
243 See, e.g., Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559,
565 (1990) (arguing the benefits of local control or localism on efficiency grounds);
Poindexter, supra note 239, at 611 (defining localism as a legitimate form of R
governance and suggesting that “[i]nstead of attempting to convince those who
have left the city (both businesses and residents) that it is in their best interest to
care about the city that they left behind, the law should validate their locational
decisions by strengthening the independence of individual communities”); Gerald
E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553, 553 (1987)
(advancing arguments in favor of affording local municipalities more power).
244 See generally Briffault, supra note 10, at 1115 (criticizing localism on the R
grounds that “the close association of local powers with local boundaries gener-
ates spillovers, fiscal disparities, and interlocal conflicts”); Ford, supra note 13, at R
1909–10 (suggesting that localism leads to racial segregation and parochial public
policy decision-making); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 371, 416–24 (2001) (suggesting that localism with its emphasis on com-
munity and boundary lines has inevitable exclusionary consequences).
245 Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505,
509–10 (2005) (“The desire for localism remains pervasive, and its voice influences
our state legislatures.”).
246 See supra subparts II.A–II.B.
247 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American
Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV.
83, 84 (1986) (illustrating and criticizing the Supreme Court’s adherence to local-
ism in its education rights cases); Wilson, supra note 14, at 1441–42 (describing R
how a strong preference for localism in public education leads to regional dispari-
ties in education between school districts).
248 See infra subpart II.C.
249 Wilson, supra note 14, at 1441. R
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ing democratic ideals by cultivating an enhanced sense of
community.250
Proponents of school district secessions suggest that in
order for them to truly reap the benefits of classic localism in
public education, the power afforded to school districts must
be decentralized down to the municipal level rather than the
county level.251  Put another way, they suggest that the only
way that the tenets of classic localism can truly occur is to
create smaller governance at the municipal rather than county
level.252  But the belief that the benefits of classic localism can
only be wrought by decentralizing power and autonomy down
to the municipal level is specious.  It is specious because it
presupposes an accuracy in defining two key localism con-
cepts, “local area” and “community,” that do not exist.  Each of
these definitional limitations is discussed in turn.
1. The Definition of “Local Area”
As a default position, classic localism accepts the proposi-
tion that the lowest level of local government—in this instance
the municipality or the city—is the appropriate level to which
power should be decentralized.253  To be sure, this is the argu-
ment that proponents of Southern school district secessions
make.254
250 Id. at 1433; see also Robert A. Garda, Jr. & David Doty, The Legal Impact of
Emerging Governance Models on Public Education and Its Office Holders, 45 URB.
LAW. 21, 49 (2013) (“The historic backbone of education governance in the United
States is ‘local control’—the notion that cities, towns, and localities control their
schools.”).
251 See Eaton, supra note 3 (citing the motivation for the secession as being R
the desire to build the “ ‘best in class’ school system ‘which exceeds the capabili-
ties of the system which we are exiting’”).
252 See Margaret Newkirk, Baton Rouge’s Rich Want New Town to Keep Poor
Pupils Out: Taxes, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-02-06/baton-rouge-s-rich-want-new-town-to-keep-poor-
pupils-out-taxes [https://perma.cc/QY7C-W43M] (describing the secession pro-
ponents as “[s]aying they want local control . . . [t]hey envision their own district
funded by property taxes from their higher-value homes”).
253 See, e.g., Shoked, supra note 218, at 1327 (“The city used to be the most R
local, or lowest, level of government responsible for welfare and health; it also
used to be the most local, or lowest, level of government responsible for plan-
ning.”); Schragger, supra note 244, at 462–63 (noting that the substantive defense R
of localism often envisions the relevant local area or community as one that is
defined by specific naturalized jurisdictional boundaries that more often than not
track municipal boundary lines).
254 See, e.g., Emily Lane, St. George Leaders Surrender Legal Battle for Now,
Vow to Explore Options, TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 16, 2015), http://www.nola.com/
news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2015/07/st_george_lawsuit_baton_rouge.html#in
cart_story_package [http://perma.cc/PGM9-P57U] (extolling the ability of a mu-
nicipally-based school district to “create an ‘outstanding’ public school system
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Yet the reliance upon the municipality or city as the rele-
vant local area to reap the benefits of localism is arguably mis-
guided.  It reflects an outdated mode of thinking that belies the
realities of the ways in which localities actually function in
modern times.  In the past, localities were intensely separated
from one another; residents did not have much interaction with
any locality other than the one in which they lived.255  This is
no longer the case.
The shift to a global economy restructured the ways in
which citizens interact with local government structures.256  In
particular, “the decentralized global economy operates best
where physical proximity and networking among a large num-
ber of specialized people and businesses can be realized.”257
Consequently, people who live in metropolitan regions often
interact with multiple municipalities throughout the day.  They
may work in one city, live in another, and go grocery shopping
in yet another.258  As a result, for purposes of reaping the bene-
fits of classic localism, “[t]he real city [may indeed be] the . . .
metropolitan area.”259
Despite the modern realities that people now interact with
multiple local governments on a daily basis, “local area” contin-
ues to be narrowly defined at the singular municipal level.  Two
problems occur when such a narrow definition of local area is
used.  First, it negates the efficiency gains purportedly associ-
ated with classic localism.  It does so by allowing large-scale
externalities260 to occur, which leads to municipalities not
and a city government that is ‘responsive to their needs and responsible with their
tax dollars’”); Marie Leech, To Split or Not to Split? Gardendale Voters to Weigh
Starting Own School System with Property Tax Vote, AL.COM (Nov. 12, 2013), http:/
/blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/11/to_split_or_not_to_split_garde.html [http://
perma.cc/RHT9-H7RR] (quoting the Gardendale City Council President as stating
“[h]aving our own school system now will ensure that our sense of educational
ideals, community values, and sound fiscal policies are preserved for future
generations”).
255 Briffault, supra note 10, at 1133 (finding that in the past localities were R
“set farther apart by unincorporated land, and people focused more of their activi-
ties within the territorial limits of their particular locality”).
256 Griffith, supra note 245, at 510 (“Today’s mobile workforce competes in R
regional markets, and economic development is best handled on a regional
basis.”).
257 Id.
258 Briffault, supra note 217, at 3 (“[A metropolitan] region is a real economic, R
social, and ecological unit. . . . [T]he people who live there do not concentrate their
daily lives within any one locality but, rather, regularly move back and forth
among multiple municipalities across a region.”).
259 See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5 (2d ed. 1995).
260 This Article uses the term “externalities” to mean a side effect or conse-
quence of one party’s actions that affects some third party.
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bearing the full cost of all their policy-related decisions.  Sec-
ond, it causes stark disparities in the quality of public educa-
tion provided by neighboring municipalities and raises
important normative questions regarding the appropriateness
of using public schools as part of an interlocal competition for
residents.
A key component of the efficiency rationale for classic lo-
calism is that residents move between smaller local govern-
ments depending upon their preferences for certain public
goods.261  Local governments presumably respond accordingly
by producing public goods at socially optimal levels in accor-
dance with residents’ tastes and desires.262
However, unless local governments bear the full costs of
their actions, externalities that the municipality is not bearing
shift outside and are borne by other governments and their
citizens.  Speaking economically, if a municipality does not
bear the full costs of its policy decisions, they may as a result
produce a sub-socially optimal level of a particular public
good.263
An example from the land-use context provides an apt il-
lustration of this logic.  If municipalities enact restrictive or
exclusionary land-use policies264 that have the effect of re-
stricting entry into the municipality for some residents while
encouraging entry by other residents, neighboring localities
that do not utilize restrictive or exclusionary land-use policies
often end up absorbing a disproportionate share of residents
who are excluded.265  As a result, both municipalities end up
theoretically producing a sub-optimal amount of low-income
261 Tiebout, supra note 229, at 417 (“[T]he government’s revenue-expenditure R
pattern for goods and services is expected to ‘adapt to’ consumers’ preferences.”).
262 Id. at 421.
263 Id. at 419 (suggesting that the accuracy of his model was dependent upon
“[t]he public services [being] supplied exhibit[ing] no external economies or dis-
economies between communities”).
264 Examples of restrictive or exclusionary land use policies include zoning
ordinances that restrict land use to single-family dwellings, allowing for no or very
few multi-family dwellings. See generally S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., concurring) (describ-
ing historical practices of exclusionary land use).
265 Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches
to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 637 (2011) (“The deci-
sions of a particular locality to exclude or include certain land uses, or to provide
public subsidies for housing construction or economic development, will inevita-
bly generate externalities or have spillover effects on neighboring localities.”);
Briffault, supra note 10, at 1134 (“When one locality acts to exclude a use, its R
neighbors may feel compelled to adopt comparable regulations to protect them-
selves from the growth they fear will be diverted to them by the initial locality’s
regulation.”).
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affordable housing and middle/upper-middle-class housing:
the municipality with exclusionary land-use policies produces
too little affordable housing and too much housing for middle/
upper-middle-class residents while the reverse may be true for
neighboring municipalities.266
Insofar as public education is concerned, when too narrow
of a definition of “local area” is utilized, similar externalities to
the housing illustration transpire.  Externalities that are both
direct and indirect occur.  The direct externality is that when
school district boundary lines track municipal boundary lines,
the school districts located in less affluent municipalities end
up absorbing a disproportionate share of poor and minority
students.267  When school districts located in poorer munici-
palities absorb a disproportionate share of poor and minority
students, social welfare losses occur because of the negative
effects that accrue when disadvantaged students are concen-
trated in one school district.268
Stated differently, for students who attend school districts
with a disproportionate share of poor and minority students,
they do not obtain the positive-peer effects associated with
schools that enroll students from different socioeconomic sta-
tuses and races.269  Instead, the districts are forced to educate
a predominately poor and minority population, whom it actu-
ally costs more to educate.270  Thus, the infusion of such a
negative externality to a neighboring municipality negates
rather than enhances efficiency.  It does so by forcing the mu-
nicipality that absorbs an excess share of poor and minority
students to produce a sub-optimal amount of the kind of high-
266 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1132 (2007)
(“Desiring to keep property taxes low and exclude social ‘undesirables,’ municipal-
ities often engage in exclusionary zoning, isolating the poor (and often racial and
ethnic minorities) in decaying urban cores or in a few low-income, low-service
cities within the region.”); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial
Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (1996) (“Too often local
citizens are united, not by a common taste for certain local services, but only by
their shared disdain for the poor or for minority groups.  As a result, ‘autonomy’
signifies the effort to fence out those who threaten their homogenous lifestyles or
those who threaten to consume more in services than they pay in taxes.”).
267 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 1437–39. R
268 See supra subpart I.C.
269 See id.
270 See Black, supra note 85, at 410–11 (“[A] small but high-profile contingent R
of predominantly poor and minority schools defy the odds and achieve at high
levels.  But delivering a quality education to students under these circumstances
can cost far more per pupil than it otherwise would.” (footnote omitted)).
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quality education that is produced when you have a mix of
students from different races and classes.271
Further, an indirect externality stems from the fact that
the positive externalities associated with providing quality pub-
lic education most certainly cross municipal boundary lines.
Indeed, quality public education has a number of positive ex-
ternalities such as reducing crime, positively impacting a met-
ropolitan region’s economic and social success, and lowering
the number of people who require public welfare assistance.272
A definition of “local area” that is limited to the individual mu-
nicipal level cannot appropriately account for all of these posi-
tive externalities when making allocative decisions regarding
public education.  Consequently, as other scholars have noted,
“[t]he more far-reaching . . . externalities [are, the more they]
necessitate supervision by the largest-scale [of] government le-
gally permissible”273 because smaller local governments are
not adequately equipped to factor all of the externalities into
their decision making.274
Finally, in addition to the efficiency problems, using too
narrow of a definition of “local area” also causes interregional
disparities in public education between municipalities.275  The
existence of interregional disparities leads to important norma-
271 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 141 (1993) (finding that poverty is associ-
ated with poor educational performance and “[t]he organization of public schools
around geographical catchment areas . . . concentrat[es] low-achieving students
in certain schools, . . . creat[ing] a social context within which poor performance is
standard and low expectations predominate.”); John Charles Boger, Education’s
“Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes Testing, and School Resource
Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1416 (2003) (“[F]or
the country as a whole, the correlation [between the proportion of a school’s
pupils in poverty and its average achievement level] is about .5 or .6.  No other
single social measure is consistently more strongly related than poverty to school
achievement.” (alteration in original) (quoting ALISON WOLF, NAT’L INST. OF EDUC.,
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY AND ACHIEVEMENT I–II (1977))).
272 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 271, at 140–42, 153; Shoked, supra note R
218, at 1367–68. R
273 Shoked, supra note 218, at 1368. R
274 For example, if municipally-based school districts truly accounted for all of
the positive externalities associated with quality public education, they might
develop a more rational school assignment policy that more freely allowed stu-
dents in other districts, particularly poor performing districts, to attend schools in
their district.  Yet this rarely happens, as very few high performing school districts
have interdistrict school transfer policies or open enrollment policies.  Instead, the
districts act in their own self-interest, narrowly conceptualizing the benefits that
will accrue to their students by keeping out students who do not live within the
geographic boundaries of the high performing district.
275 Wilson, supra note 14, at 1441–42 (describing how a strong preference for R
localism in public education leads to regional disparities in education between
school districts).
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tive questions about the use of public schools as a bargaining
chip in the interlocal competition for residents.  For example,
proponents of the Southern school district secessions make
competition-based arguments regarding efficiency as a reason
for ceding local control of schools to individual cities or munici-
palities.  In particular, they contend that having their own
school district will enable them to create a high-quality district
that they can use as an asset in winning the interlocal competi-
tion for residents and businesses.276
Given the ways in which municipalities within regions are
economically and socially interdependent, it is not apparent
that such interlocal competition is healthy for the individual
municipalities or the region as a whole if it results in school
districts that offer substantially different and disparate quali-
ties of education.277  Moreover, it is also unclear that it is nor-
matively appropriate to use public education as a bargaining
chip in interlocal competition for residents and businesses.
From the inception of the provision of free public education
in America, public education was viewed as being vital to the
health and well-being of the American democracy.278  It was
viewed, and still is in some ways today, as being the training
ground for citizens, as giving citizens the tools necessary to
make a living, and as leveling the playing field so that social
mobility across classes can occur.279  This vision of public edu-
cation is inapposite with the Tieboutian principles of efficiency
276 See, e.g., Sarah A. McCarty, Gardendale Council Members  Unanimously
Support Separate City School System, AL.COM (Nov. 12, 2013), http://blog.al.com/
spotnews/2013/06/gardendale_council_members_una.html [https://perma.cc/
3LG9-QY6Z] (quoting the city council president as saying “[o]ne thing you’ve got to
look at as far as your town is the fact that having your own school system is
definitely a draw.  People migrate to cities that have their own school systems.
Typically you see a definite significance in property value increases.”).
277 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 1446 (demonstrating how “interlocal compe- R
tition for residents strengthens wealthy white school districts while weakening
poorer minority districts”).
278 See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW 13 (2001) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson as saying that universal public education was necessary to
ensure “the selection of the youths of genius from among the classes of the poor”
and “to avail the State of those talents which nature has sown so liberally among
the poor as the rich, but which perish without use, if not sought for and
cultivated”).
279 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 134 (1987) (“The democratic
truth in equalization is that all children should learn enough to be able not just to
live a minimally decent life, but also to participate effectively in the democratic
processes by which individual choices are socially structured.  A democratic state,
therefore, must take steps to avoid those inequalities that deprive children of
educational attainment adequate to participate in the political processes.” (em-
phasis omitted)).
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that are purportedly occurring when there is an interlocal com-
petition for residents.
Tiebout relies purely on a market model in which individu-
als maximize their own individual goals as a way to obtain
efficiency for individual local governments.280  However, as evi-
denced by the aforementioned purposes of public education,
public education is a social good.281  Society has independent
interests in maximizing the collective needs and values of pub-
lic education.  Consequently, a Tieboutian efficiency model
predicated on allowing variance in the quality of public educa-
tion across school district boundary lines and using those vari-
ances as a means of better positioning certain localities in
relation to others, runs counter to the social good function of
public education.  Further, given the reality that municipal
boundary lines are often circumscribed by both race and class,
it reinforces group-based inequality,282 which runs counter to
one of the fundamental purposes of public education—amelio-
rating inequality.
In sum, the definition of “local area” used in conceptualiz-
ing the benefits likely to accrue from classic localism is too
narrow.  Such a narrow definition undercuts the efficiency jus-
tification for decentralized public education governance struc-
tures because it allows negative externalities to accrue and
leads to a sub-optimal production of high-quality public educa-
tion in some municipalities.  It also highlights the ways in
which the Tieboutian market-based efficiency model for allo-
cating public goods is a mismatch for allocating public educa-
tion given that public education is supposed to function as a
social good.
2. The Definition of “Community”
One of the strongest normative justifications for classic
localism is that it furthers community.  In particular, the com-
munity rationale for classic localism portends that municipali-
ties are not just “small groups of people who happen to buy
280 See supra notes 229–238 and accompanying text. R
281 See Boger, supra note 271, at 1410–11 (decrying the efficiency rationale for R
public education and instead arguing that “public schooling is more than a con-
sumer good provided for the benefit of students and their parents.  Society itself
has deep and legitimate interests in social re-production—the intellectual, moral,
and social development of the present youth who must become society’s leaders in
all fields of endeavor.”).
282 See ANDERSON, supra note 176, at 27 (“When important goods are asym- R
metrically distributed across space and groups are sorted into separate spaces
containing more or less of these goods, group inequality results.”).
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public services or engage in public decision-making to-
gether.”283  Instead, municipalities consist of people who vol-
untarily gravitate to territorial spaces because those spaces are
comprised of people who share their same values and
norms.284
Importantly, citizens are presumed to voluntarily locate in
municipalities precisely because they wish to associate with
like-minded individuals who share their norms and values.285
Smaller and more homogenous communities are said to more
effectively “galvanize around issues that impact their commu-
nity and to agree on collective courses of action” that best suit
their needs.286  As such, the community justification for classic
localism advocates affording municipalities power and auton-
omy because doing so purportedly vindicates individual choice
and allows citizens to form communities that are responsive to
their needs.287
The community rationale features prominently in the local-
ism justification for Southern municipal secessions from
school districts.  Members of the Gardendale city council, for
example, justified their decision to secede from the Jefferson
County School District on the grounds that Gardendale re-
sidents should be able to create a school district that meets the
specific needs of Gardendale residents.288  They also reasoned
that the creation of a Gardendale School District would better
enable them to enact curricular changes and policy reforms
suited to the needs of students in Gardendale.289  Residents in
St. George, Louisiana and other municipalities in the South
283 Briffault, supra note 217, at 17. R
284 Id.
285 See id.
286 Wilson, supra note 14, at 1433. R
287 See Schragger, supra note 244, at 391 (summarizing the arguments in R
favor of the community justification for localism as being that “[d]ecentralized
government allows for a wider array of forms of association, thereby vindicating
individual autonomy and the efficiency and responsiveness of government in
general.”).
288 See, e.g., McCarty, supra note 276 (noting that one council member indi- R
cated that “[e]ach community has different needs for what it needs to expand on,
and Gardendale might be different than Mortimer Jordan or Center Point.  I just
think issues will be handled more effectively by a local school board that’s more
accountable to people in Gardendale.”).
289 CITY OF GARDENDALE, CREATING A GARDENDALE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM: FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2, http://www.cityofgardendale.com/FILE_UPLOADS/
FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9SU-4XS7] (noting that a “greater community feel
makes parents more comfortable when interacting with teachers and administra-
tors” and that local control will allow “[o]pportunities for innovation in encourag-
ing students to pursue the study of mathematics and science”).
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seeking to secede from county-based school districts put forth
similar arguments.290
This community justification for classic localism, particu-
larly in the context of municipal secessions from school dis-
tricts, raises important questions regarding equity and
community formation.  For starters, the community that local-
ism seeks to reify is arguably one based on principles of exclu-
sion rather than inclusion.  This is the case because intense
racial and class-based segregation often exists between munic-
ipalities.291  Because of the intense racial and economic segre-
gation that exists between municipalities, any community-
building bred by localism will necessarily be an exclusionary
one based on race and class.  To that end, localism vis-a`-vis
municipal secessions from county-based school districts “facil-
itates a perverse type of community-building that breeds racial
and economic exclusion.”292  This type of community-building
is particularly dangerous in the South, given its brutal history
of racial exclusion in schools.
Further, the community-building rationale for localism
presupposes that citizens voluntary elect to live in municipali-
ties that best meet their needs and in which like-minded people
exist.  As a matter of theory and practical application, this jus-
tification for localism is only partially true.  Certainly those who
are more affluent and/or have greater social and political capi-
tal can shop for a municipality that best meets their needs,
particularly when it comes to schools.293  In this sense, the
formation of communities, particularly school-based commu-
nities, is indeed intentional.
290 See Jack Barlow, The St. George Movement in Baton Rouge: An Education
Revolution, or White Flight?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/us-news/2015/apr/08/st-george-movement-baton-rouge-louisiana-
schools [https://perma.cc/H5ZE-CWMA] (reporting that the St. George secession
attempt is rooted in a desire for more autonomy over the St. George community
and their affairs); Tom Charlier, Eight School Systems Open in Shelby County with
Few Problems, COM. APPEAL (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.commercialappeal.com/
news/schools/eight-school-systems-open-in-shelby-county-with-few-problems-
ep-536009714-324356851.html [http://perma.cc/2ABG-R8PR] (describing com-
munity-based rationales for secession of eight suburban municipalities from the
Shelby County, Tennessee School District).
291 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 271, at 22–25. R
292 Wilson, supra note 14, at 1435. R
293 See Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice
and the Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177, 192–94
(2002) (chronicling the ways in which more affluent homebuyers intentionally
shop for homes based on perceptions regarding the quality of the public school
district in which the home is located).
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However, for many poor and minority families, the munici-
pality or neighborhood in which they live is not necessarily
based on an intentional and well-calculated choice.294  Instead,
such families are often forced to locate to a community that is
most affordable or offers the kinds of support networks that
they need in order to subsist.295  Thus, the community-build-
ing rationale for localism, particularly to the extent it relies on
notions of voluntary community formations, is often a one-way
street that can rarely be traveled by poor and minority families.
Thus, because municipal boundary lines are more typically
built around principles of exclusion rather than inclusion, and
the choice to move to a particular municipality is not voluntary
for everyone, the community rationale for localism is arguably
seriously flawed.
All told, the localism justification for municipal secessions
from Southern school districts specifically has many shortcom-
ings.  In particular, the flawed definition of “local area,” along
with the incoherent connection between residence and commu-
nity, call into question whether municipal secessions from
county-based school districts actually result in the benefits of
classic localism that proponents suggest that they do.  The
subpart that follows considers an alternative form of localism—
defensive localism—and suggests that municipal secessions
may actually be more likely to result in defensive localism than
classic localism.
C. Defensive Localism
As discussed in the preceding subparts, adherence to lo-
calism results in individual cities or municipalities purporting
to become their own separate and autonomous enclaves.  The
boundary lines of these municipalities are at least in theory
permeable: citizens can choose to “vote with their feet” and
locate themselves within the boundary lines of any municipal-
ity.  Yet municipalities have wide latitude to craft zoning and
taxation policies that effectively determine who lives there (and
294 Schragger, supra note 244, at 392–93 (describing the limitations of com- R
munity formation vis-a`-vis justifications for localism).
295 See, e.g., Joanna M. Reed et al., Voucher Use, Labor Force Participation,
and Life Priorities: Findings from the Gautreaux Two Housing Mobility Study, 8
CITYSCAPE 219, 235 (2005) (describing the importance of social networks in the
housing choices of poor minority participants in a housing mobility study and
noting that their commitment to those networks made it unlikely that they would
move to a higher opportunity area).
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who does not).296  To that end, “powerful incentives [exist] for
well-off citizens to form separate political jurisdictions, thus
shielding themselves from the economic costs and political
dangers of coping with the less well-off.”297  Indeed, municipali-
ties and their boundary lines are demarcated by both race and
class.298
Classic localism ignores the aforementioned race and
class-based fragmentation that marks American cities and mu-
nicipalities.  In addition to failing to account for racial plural-
ism, classic localism also assumes that local governments
assert significant power and autonomy in ways that allow them
to control their own destinies.  However, some scholars ques-
tion both the failure of localism to account for modern-day
racial pluralism and the amount of power and autonomy that
local governments actually have.299
The failure of classic localism to acknowledge the ways in
which municipalities within the American metropolis are
marked along the lines of race and class, along with the con-
tested belief that local governments do indeed exercise power
and autonomy, has led some theorists to fashion an alternative
theory of localism called defensive localism.300  The scholarly
literature on defensive localism conjoins two different and dis-
parate hypotheses as to how municipalities utilize local auton-
omy in a defensive posture.
The defensive localism framework is an apt one in which to
examine the Southern municipal secessions from school dis-
tricts.  For the reasons articulated in subpart III.B, it is not
296 See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the
“Get What You Pay for” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 381 (2004)
(describing the wide range of taxation tools that municipalities have at their
disposal and how the techniques they choose to implement influences who ulti-
mately lives there).
297 See Margaret Weir, Urban Poverty and Defensive Localism, DISSENT MAG.
337, 339 (1994).
298 See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1047
(1996) (“Every American metropolitan area is now divided into districts that are so
different from each other they seem to be different worlds.  Residential neighbor-
hoods are African American, Asian, Latino, or white, and upper middle class,
middle class, working class, or poor; many are populated by people who share a
single class and racial or ethnic status.”).
299 See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 30, at 1994 (critiquing localism and noting R
that “empirical literature on locational choice suggests that race, as opposed to
the mix of services and taxes a jurisdiction offers, is the strongest of the factors
that influence locational decisions”); Frug, supra note 238, at 1059–60 (arguing R
that cities or municipalities are intentionally kept powerless and unable to exer-
cise much autonomy or authority and that true power and autonomy lies with the
state).
300 See infra section III.C.1.
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clear that school district secessions will actually provide all of
the classic benefits of localism that proponents suggest that
they will.  Instead, a close examination of the secessions could
arguably lead to the conclusion that the secessions evidence a
combination of the first and second suppositions regarding de-
fensive localism, more than they do classic localism.  Each of
these principles of defensive localism and their relevance to the
Southern school district secessions is considered in the sec-
tions that follow.
1. Defensive Localism as Spatially Containing Social and
Economic Problems
Critics of localism suggest that decentralization of power
down to local governments at the municipal level is designed
less for purposes of affording local autonomy and more for the
subversive purpose of limiting state action in addressing urban
economic and social problems.301  More specifically, this itera-
tion of defensive localism suggests that power and autonomy
are pushed down to lower levels of government so that the
social problems associated with poverty—and their costs—can
be contained within defined spatial and political boundaries.302
While proponents of this version of defensive localism acknowl-
edge that the use of localism in a defensive manner is “not
explicitly organized around race, . . . racial antipathies [are]
nonetheless central to its success.”303
Further, the proponents of this version of defensive local-
ism also suggest that “[i]n a spatial context segregated by race
and income, local empowerment can become a very conserva-
tive goal that allows the broader political community to concen-
trate social and economic problems in particular places and
refuse to take responsibility for those problems.”304  In essence,
this version of defensive localism suggests that decentraliza-
tion allows spatial and jurisdictional divisions to serve as a
proxy for race and class-based divisions.  Put another way,
decentralization through localism allows the state to do implic-
itly what it cannot do explicitly for both legal and political rea-
sons: divide and allocate public education resources on the
basis of race and class.
Applying this first theory of defensive localism to the seces-
sions, a primary effect of the secessions is often to congregate
301 See Weir, supra note 297, at 338–39. R
302 Id. at 342.
303 Id. at 337.
304 Id. at 341.
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poor and minority students in the county-based districts while
isolating white and affluent students in the suburban munici-
pal districts.  Indeed, the Jefferson County Board of Education
is opposed to the Gardendale secession for this very reason.305
Opponents of the St. George secession also raise this con-
cern.306  Southern municipal secessions in other states are
also being opposed on these grounds.307
While proponents of the secessions contend that race and
class-based isolation is not their intent,308 the likely impact of
the secessions should be the controlling factor.  This is espe-
cially true given the history and ramifications of racial segrega-
tion in Southern schools.  While the secessions amount to a
facially race- and class-neutral mechanism for purportedly
seeking greater local autonomy, they at the same time segre-
gate schools in the South by both race and class, much in the
same way that the Supreme Court warned against in Wright.309
Race-neutral policies like the secessions, when “set against an
[sic] historical backdrop of state action in the service of racial
segregation . . . predictably reproduce and entrench racial seg-
regation and the racial-caste system that accompanies it.”310
Because the secessions will recreate racially identifiable
school systems in the South, the effect will be to leave poorer
and minority communities on their own to overcome the inher-
ent disadvantages that are endemic to predominantly poor and
305 Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 16 (arguing that the Jefferson R
County Board of Education is at a crossroads in terms of its ability to provide
students with a desegregated education because of “school system separations
and annexations, . . . which, if unabated, could eventually leave it a resegregated
system”).
306 See Samuels, supra note 2 (noting that opposition to the St. George seces- R
sion exists because the racial demographics of the new St. George district would
be overwhelmingly white and affluent while the East Baton Rouge Parish District
would be predominately Black and poor).
307 See, e.g., Brantley, supra note 32 (documenting criticisms of a school dis- R
trict secession in Pulaski County, Arkansas on the grounds that it will “leave a
majority black remnant school district with inferior facilities”); Sam Dillon, Merger
of Memphis and County School Districts Revives Race and Class Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/education/merger-
of-memphis-and-county-school-districts-revives-challenges.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/6CSU-BZTW] (describing a pattern of racial fear causing the predomi-
nantly white suburbs to secede from the Shelby County, Tennessee School Dis-
trict and to form their own independent school districts).
308 See supra subpart III.B.
309 Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S 451, 467–68 (1972) (rejecting argu-
ments regarding the need for local autonomy on the grounds that it would harm
the ability of minority students to obtain a quality desegregated education).
310 Ford, supra note 13, at 1845. R
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minority schools.311  In particular, research suggests that pre-
dominately poor and minority schools deliver an inadequate
and inferior education to students in several major curricular
areas.312  While poor and minority students are certainly capa-
ble of learning in the absence of white and affluent students,
the institutional limitations imposed by racial segregation and
high levels of poverty in schools make it exceedingly difficult.313
On the other hand, by virtue of the demographics alone,
the newly created suburban school districts will be able to
congregate both the tangible and intangible benefits that come
with having predominantly white and affluent students in a
single school district.314  They will also be able to lessen the
social costs that often accompany educating poor students.315
Indeed, proponents of the St. George secession hit upon this
undercurrent by labeling the secession attempt as “middle-
class and upper-middle-class flight.”316  In short, the seces-
sions in many ways comport with the first theory of defensive
localism in which localism is used in a defensive posture in
order to spatially contain social and economic problems.
2. Defensive Localism as a Form of Reasserting Local
Autonomy and Power
The second theory of defensive localism, more sympathetic
to municipalities, is advanced by proponents of localism.  It
hypothesizes that municipalities use local power in a defensive
311 For a discussion regarding the challenges faced by predominately poor and
minority schools, see supra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. R
312 Those curricular areas include curriculum, teacher quality, student
achievement, graduation rates, access, and readiness for higher education. See
Black, supra note 85, at 404–08. R
313 Id. at 404 (“It is not just that a student’s individual demographic character-
istics make him or her less likely to succeed; rather, high-poverty schools have a
negative impact on a student’s educational outcomes regardless of the student’s
individual socioeconomic status.”).
314 Id. at 410 (“[T]he intangible benefits that middle-income students bring to
the learning environment make them a vital resource. . . . Middle-income parents
instinctively recognize this and jockey to enroll their children in solidly middle-
income schools or, at least, middle-income classes if they cannot secure a middle
class school.”).
315 See, e.g., id. at 403 (“[T]he cost of delivering adequate or equal educational
opportunities in schools with concentrated poverty far exceeds the cost of deliver-
ing adequate or equal opportunities in middle-income schools.”); Michael A.
Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 47, 115 (2012) (noting the increased costs required to properly educate poor,
minority, and other disadvantaged students).
316 Diana Samuels, St. George Incorporation Portrayed as ‘Secession’ in Na-
tional Media, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.nola.com/news/baton-
rouge/index.ssf/2013/12/st_george_incorporation_portra.html [http://
perma.cc/ZE78-ZNHX] (quoting state Senator Mack “Bodi” White).
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manner not for nefarious reasons but because local autonomy
for municipalities is in fact illusory.317  In particular, the sec-
ond theory suggests that defensive localism is “a form of active
engagement that is spurred by a feeling of not being in
control.”318
Simply put, the second theory of defensive localism
portends that defensive localism is likely to occur when munic-
ipalities feel “limits on local policymaking, and greater-than-
local forces exert[ing] significant pressure on local choices.”319
When municipalities feel powerless, a parochial mindset takes
over and prompts them to use the limited power they do have to
protect their resources from those outside of the municipality.
Supporters of this second theory of defensive localism suggest
that the answer is not to centralize power but to instead truly
afford localities more power and autonomy so that they start
using the little autonomy they have in a more collaborative
manner.320
Refrains of this second theory of defensive localism can be
seen in the Southern municipal school district secessions as
well.  Traditionally, local school districts have been afforded, as
a matter of law, power and autonomy over issues of school
governance such as funding, school assignment, and curricu-
lum.321  Yet the power that they have is increasingly being lim-
ited by state and federal mandates.322  Indeed, state
departments of education play a significant role in both school
317 David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field
from the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 264–67 (2005).
318 Id. at 271.
319 Id. at 261.
320 Id.
321 See Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School
District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 864 (2006) (“States’ sweeping grants of authority to
districts generally include power to tax (a power primarily exercised through the
property tax); to budget and to spend; to hire and to fire, powers especially impor-
tant vis-a`-vis the appointment of the district superintendent and the conduct of
collective bargaining with teachers; to set curricula; and to establish general
policies for the conduct of all aspects of the educational program.”).
322 See, e.g., Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr., American Schools and the
Future of Local Control, 77 PUB. INT. 77, 90 (1984) (“ ‘[L]ocal control of public
education’ as traditionally conceived is in reality disappearing, even though its
facade is nearly everywhere intact. . . . [L]ocal school systems are evolving in
practice into something that they always were in a constitutional sense:
subordinate administrative units of a state educational system, with some
residual power to modify statewide regulations and procedures in order to ease
their implementation within a particular community, and with the residual au-
thority (in most states, though not all) to supplement state spending with locally
raised revenues.”); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left
Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 937 (2004) (describing the federal No Child Left
Behind Act as “remarkably ambitious and unusually intrusive”).
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funding and in setting curriculum.  States can and often do
intrude in areas of funding and curriculum in ways in which
local districts disapprove.323  Individual municipalities that are
part of a county-based school district may feel particularly con-
strained because their school governance is limited by federal,
state, and county layers of governance.  In order to alleviate the
feeling of powerlessness that municipalities within county-
based school districts might feel, in accordance with the sec-
ond theory of defensive localism, municipalities are using the
power and autonomy they do have under state law to try and
separate themselves from the county districts and to forge their
own paths.
Indeed, a common refrain oft heard from proponents of
secessions is that the county-based school systems leave them
completely powerless, that they lack the autonomy to govern
schools as they see fit.324  Another argument is that their tax
dollars make up the majority of the tax dollars used to fund the
schools but that they are not getting the benefit of the
schools.325  They further suggest that decentralizing from a
county-based system of education to a municipally-based sys-
tem of education will increase their ability to actually enjoy true
local autonomy in the areas of school funding, teacher selec-
tion, and curriculum.326  Such refrains closely parallel the sec-
ond theory of defensive localism.
323 See, e.g., Fred Davenport, Local School Board Leaders Upset Over State’s
Actions to Take $80 Million from Education Trust Fund, WVTM 13 (Sept. 20, 2015),
http://www.wvtm13.com/news/local-school-board-leaders-upset-over-states-
actions-to-take-80-million-from-education-trust-fund/35373692 [https://
perma.cc/6FXN-KNYN] (describing the Alabama State Legislature’s intent to re-
duce state funding for schools by 80 million dollars and the dissenting voices at
the local level).
324 See, e.g., Barlow, supra note 290 (summarizing the motivations for the R
attempted secession by St. George residents and noting that residents are “ag-
grieved about the school system” and that the secession attempt comes from a
place of “frustration”); McCarty, supra note 276 (citing a Gardendale City Council R
member as favoring the secession because it would “bring[ ] forth more accounta-
bility with the school board and the superintendent living in the community.”).
325 See, e.g., JR Ball, Baton Rouge, ‘It’s the Public Schools, Stupid!,’ TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nola.com/opinions/baton-rouge/index.
ssf/2015/10/baton_rouge_public_schools.html#incart_story_package [https://
perma.cc/U2RX-Z45D] (listing among the reasons for the St. George attempted
secession residents complaints about “the percentage of taxes it pays relative to
other income groups, and what it gets in return for those public dollars, [and] a
public school system (absent the magnet and gifted & talented programs) unwor-
thy of educating [their] children”); Eaton, supra note 3 (finding that a strong R
motivation for the secessions is that suburban municipalities do not prefer to
share “tax dollars, benefits of economic growth, or power on school boards”).
326 See, e.g., Scott McKay, Here Comes St. George, AM. SPECTATOR (June 5,
2015), http://spectator.org/articles/62967/here-comes-st-george [https://
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In sum, Southern suburban municipal secessions evi-
dence forms of both the first and second theories of defensive
localism.  Acts rooted in defensive localism are detrimental be-
cause they reduce municipality willingness to collaborate with
neighboring localities, despite the many ways in which the vari-
ous neighboring localities are interconnected.  Thus, whether
the defensive localism is based on a desire to separate due to
racial antipathies or a feeling of powerlessness, the impact is
the same.  It decreases willingness of the suburban to partici-
pate in a more inclusive form of governance that benefits re-
sidents both inside and outside of the municipal boundary
lines, notwithstanding the extra-local effects of public educa-
tion.  As described in the Part that follows, such an exercise of
defensive localism can lead to a form of localism that is harmful
to the community at large.
IV
A THEORY OF DESTRUCTIVE LOCALISM: A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR EVALUATING LOCALISM JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
SECESSIONS OR DECENTRALIZATION
Right now, there exists an almost ironclad link between a
child’s ZIP code and her chances of success . . . . Our educa-
tion system, traditionally thought of as the chief mechanism
to address the opportunity gap, instead too often reflects
and entrenches existing societal inequities.327
This Part introduces the concept of destructive localism to
describe the impact of localism that is rooted in defensive local-
ism rather than classic localism.  It then develops a normative
framework to assess the localism justification for Southern
suburban municipal school district secessions.  While the
framework is developed in the context of school district seces-
sions, it might also be used to normatively assess decentraliza-
tion of public education governance structures more broadly.
perma.cc/R2F3-PWKE] (touting the St. George secession as presenting an oppor-
tunity to “design from scratch a 21st century school system” and an opportunity
for middle-class self-governance that would allow for innovation and the creation
of better schools).
327 Corydon Ireland, The Costs of Inequality: Education is the Key to It All, U.S.
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/the-
costs-of-inequality-education-is-the-key-to-it-all?page=2 [http://perma.cc/
7AFQ-6RJ6] (quoting Dean of Harvard Graduate School of Education James E.
Ryan).
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A. Theory of Destructive Localism
Support for classic localism is predicated on the premise
that decentralization of powers down to the city or municipality
is on the whole beneficial for American democracy.  In accor-
dance with Thomas Jefferson’s vision, the autonomy that clas-
sic localism affords municipalities is supposed to buttress
democratic ideals.  Yet, as described in the preceding Parts,
classic localism undeniably can have a race- and class-based
exclusionary impact.  It benefits a “favored quarter,” namely
more affluent and typically white citizens, by allowing them to
build enclaves for themselves while excluding citizens, such as
racial minorities and the poor, who are seen as less than
desirable.328
Importantly, the pluralistic American democracy that
exists today is very different from the democracy that Jefferson
likely envisioned when he championed classic localism.  His
vision was admittedly one consisting of primarily white com-
munities.329  Given the status of Blacks and other racial minor-
ities at the time of Jefferson’s localism musings, his vision of a
localist democratic governance system did not account for the
cleavages that are prone to exist in a racially pluralistic society.
Instead of buttressing democratic ideals in a way that is inclu-
sive of the modern pluralistic democracy, modern localism in
too many instances is doing just the opposite: splintering dem-
ocratic ideals of citizenship by serving as a conduit for legalized
race- and class-based segregation.  While this Article focuses
on public education and Southern school district secessions,
the segregative import of localism can also be seen in other
areas such as housing, transportation, and policing as well.330
328 See Cashin, supra note 30, at 1987 (critiquing the exclusionary import of R
localism and suggesting localism breeds a “favored quarter,” defined as “suburbs
that typically represent about a quarter of the entire regional population but that
also tend to capture the largest share of the region’s public infrastructure invest-
ments and job growth”).
329 See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Meton-
ymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 373 (2009) (summarizing the work of
historians who found that “Jefferson did not view black men as nearly the equal of
whites”).
330 See, e.g., JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 67–85 (2006) (discussing connections
between localism and transportation); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litiga-
tion in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1415–18 (2015)
(describing the impact of decentralization and localism on law enforcement);
David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Re-
gionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1152 (2008) (demonstrating the connection
between localism and housing segregation).
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The realities wrought by modern invocations of localism
result in what this Article defines as “destructive localism.”
Destructive localism, this Article contends, occurs when one
group enjoys the benefits that come with local autonomy but
does so by: (i) forming communities that are racially and eco-
nomically homogenous; (ii) taking advantage of the benefits of
being connected to a larger network of municipalities while at
the same distancing themselves from the social and financial
costs associated with group membership; and (iii) inflicting
tangible and/or intangible harm on neighboring localities.
More precisely stated, destructive localism occurs when local
autonomy is afforded to one group such that its members are
able to enjoy the benefits of classic localism at the cost or
expense of another group.  The subpart that follows outlines
the ways in which Southern municipal secessions from school
districts in some ways evince destructive localism.
B. School District Secessions and Destructive Localism
Using the definition of destructive localism outlined in the
preceding subpart, a case can be made that the school district
secessions evidence destructive localism.  For starters, discus-
sions about school district boundary lines are essentially dis-
cussions about “citizenship,” specifically which students are
afforded citizenship and which students are denied citizenship
in a school-based community.  The secessions, through the
drawing of new school district boundary lines, limit citizenship
in the new districts to the citizens who reside within the munic-
ipalities’ boundary lines.  Because those municipality bound-
ary lines are more often than not demarcated by both race and
class, the new forms of school citizenship are similarly demar-
cated by both race and class.  Thus, the demographics of new
districts, like Gardendale, result in the formation of racially
and economically homogenous communities.
Further, by distancing themselves from the social and fi-
nancial costs associated with group membership, the seces-
sionists in Gardendale, St. George, and elsewhere typically
take with them county school district infrastructure in the form
of school buildings and in some cases even teachers.331  While
most of the secessionists are usually required to pay some
facilities replacement fee, the amount of the fee is often dis-
puted and can be far less than what would be perceived as an
331 See supra subparts II.A–II.B.
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adequate amount by the jurisdiction from which secession is
occurring.332
In doing so, the seceding districts get to enjoy autonomy
over infrastructure that was paid for by county-based taxes,
which students who do not qualify for citizenship in the newly
created school districts will be prohibited from enjoying.  The
districts seceded from may also be taxed with “legacy costs”
that in many instances will be borne solely by them and not the
newly created school district.333  The aforementioned financial
costs are borne by neighboring localities that remain a part of
the county-based school districts, even as the seceding munici-
palities are able to enjoy their fruits.
In addition to the financial costs, possibly even more prob-
lematic are the social costs.  The costs of properly educating
poor and minority students is often high both in terms of real
dollars and the intangible environmental supports needed.  By
cordoning themselves off, seceding municipalities avoid these
costs.  The racial resegregation of schools also comes with a
social cost, particularly given the South’s past history of racial
segregation in schools.  That social cost is the perpetuation of
an education for minority students less full and adequate than
the one white students in the predominately white municipal
districts are receiving.  It will only serve to exacerbate the long-
standing racial inequalities in the South that Brown I once
condemned.  Most disturbingly, because racial segregation is
done under the cover of the race-neutral rubric of localism, it is
effectively done with the sanction of the law and without legal
recourse.
Finally, the secessions inflict serious tangible and intangi-
ble harm on the neighboring localities that remain in the
county-based districts.  They do so by creating new boundary
lines that in all likelihood will encourage white and affluent
flight into those localities.334  Such flight not only poses harm
to the health and vitality of the county-based school systems
332 The attempted secession in Gardendale provides an acute example of this.
The JCSD requested thirty-three million dollars to provide new, equivalent facili-
ties to replace the ones that Gardendale will take with it in the separation.  A state
superintendent determined that Gardendale would only have to pay eight million
dollars. Supplemental Report, supra note 140, at 5, 8–9.  The amount that will be R
paid is still being contested by both parties. See id. at 25–26.
333 See supra subpart II.B (describing legacy costs as “ongoing legally obli-
gated payments for things such as employee retirement that the . . . district [losing
territory and students are] required to continue paying”).
334 See generally GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL
FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 35–36 (1991) (setting forth an argu-
ment that boundary lines serve a recruitment function by establishing patterns
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but also to the neighboring localities’ general purpose local
governments that are a part of the county-based school sys-
tems.  The Supreme Court in Wright long ago recognized the
dangers of school district secessions and white flight and for
that reason proscribed them in the early days of school deseg-
regation.335  The very concerns that the Court in Wright warned
against pose a real danger of happening, but because the pre-
sent secessions are being carried out under the guise of local-
ism, they are ostensibly immune from meaningful legal
challenge.
In sum, Southern municipal secessions from county-based
school districts result in a form of destructive localism that
allows the seceding municipalities to enjoy the fruits of local
autonomy but at the expense of the neighboring localities in
the county-based school systems that they leave behind.  The
subpart that follows offers criteria that can help ferret out mu-
nicipal secessions, or decentralization more broadly, that pro-
mote harmful destructive localism.
C. Framework for Evaluating the Localism Justification
for Municipal Secessions
Because of the racially and economically segregated nature
of local municipalities, when localism is used as a justifying
principle to decentralize education governance structures, un-
settling results can ensue.  The Southern school district seces-
sions in particular can sharpen and perpetuate race- and
class-based inequalities amongst citizens and allow a “favored
quarter” to wall themselves off from the social and financial
costs incurred by the larger community.
Yet the localism justification for decentralization more
broadly, and municipal secession generally in the context of
public education governance structures, is not always spe-
cious.  The classic tenets of localism, namely efficiency, in-
creased citizen participation, and an enhanced sense of
community, when appropriately contextualized, are legitimate
reasons in some instances to favor localist governance struc-
tures.  The difficulty lies in ensuring that municipalities are not
that give residents information about the types of residents that reside in a partic-
ular municipality).
335 See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972) (“Certainly,
desegregation is not achieved by splitting a single school system operating ‘white
schools’ and ‘Negro schools’ into two new systems, each operating unitary schools
within its borders, where one of the two new systems is, in fact, ‘white’ and the
other is, in fact, ‘Negro.’”).
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obtaining those classic benefits of localism while simultane-
ously perpetuating destructive localism.
Secessions have impacts that stretch beyond the individ-
ual municipality or even the county-based school districts.  In-
deed, the effect of any secession, whether by a general purpose
local government or school district, has ramifications for the
economic and social viability of the state as a whole.336  As
such, states should have an incentive to more carefully monitor
secessions from school districts.  This section offers criteria
that can be used by both state legislators and judges oversee-
ing school desegregation orders in evaluating the justness of
the localism justification for Southern school district seces-
sions.  While the framework is set forth in the context of school
district secessions, it might also be applied more to decentrali-
zation in public education more broadly.
1. Appropriate Conceptualization of Community
Currently, localism presupposes that the appropriate or
relevant definition of community should be based on municipal
boundary lines.  For the reasons articulated in the preceding
Parts, such a definition of community ignores the reality of how
people, particularly poor and minority residents, actually come
to reside in a community.  It also fails to account for the inter-
connected nature of municipalities within metropolitan re-
gions, causing interlocal externalities which breed inefficiency.
State legislatures have plenary authority in setting forth
the rules for municipal secession, particularly for school dis-
tricts, given that most school districts typically do not enjoy
home rule authority.337  As such, an important criterion that
should go into the state legislative calculus of whether and how
to permit secession is the quality of the community that would
be formed as a result of the secession.
Two factors might be useful in making this determination.
First, legislators should consider the racial and socioeconomic
demographics of the new community formed by the secession
along with how it impacts the racial and socioeconomic
demographics of the remaining territorial community from
which secession is occurring.  While racially and economically
homogenous demographics are not indicative of malicious in-
tent, intent should not be the metric by which legislators gauge
whether the communities formed as a result of the secessions
336 Viteritti, supra note 129, at 62–63 (acknowledging that secessions impact R
both the territories involved in the secession as well as the state).
337 See supra section II.C.1.
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are justifiable.  Instead, given the well-known negative conse-
quences of racially and economically segregated schools, seces-
sions that result in racially and economically homogenous
communities should be disfavored.338  To be sure, private pref-
erences for homogenous racial demographics must be sub-
verted for the betterment of the pluralistic society in which we
live.
Second, legislators should consider whether the entire
community from which secession will occur truly consents to
secession.  Obtaining consent is an important part of commu-
nity formation.  It ensures that consent to community forma-
tion is not presumed to exist simply because of one’s place of
residence.  To that end, residents of the territory from which
secession will occur should be able to exercise their voice in
some way over the propriety of the secession.  Admittedly, re-
quiring a positive vote by the entire territory from which seces-
sion is sought may prevent those who wish to secede from
doing so simply because they are outnumbered by majoritarian
interests.339
However, an alternative might be to adopt a voting struc-
ture that appropriately balances the interest in autonomy of
the territory that is seeking secession with the interest of the
territory from which secession is sought in remaining intact,
and most importantly with the greater interest of the metropoli-
tan region as a whole.  One way to accomplish this might be to
adopt the following three-tiered voting structure proposed by
Professor Richard Briffault:
(i) conduct a referendum in the area seeking to secede in
order to get an authoritative statement of the views of the
people who would obtain municipal independence; then (ii)
require the consent of the municipality from which they seek
to secede, since that municipality would be directly and sig-
nificantly affected by secession . . . [; and] then (iii) provide for
a state-level review of the action of the existing municipality,
a review that could overturn the denial of consent to seces-
sion on the basis of the “overall public interest” of the
region.340
338 For a discussion of the ills associated with racially and economically segre-
gated schools, see supra subpart I.C.
339 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 128, at 847  (“Secession should be predi- R
cated on a showing that the municipal majority is systematically exploiting the
minority, or at the very least that the majority is advancing only its own values
and consistently ignoring the minority’s needs and interests.”).
340 Id. at 818–19.
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Adopting such a voting structure might be a good way to
evaluate whether a municipal secession serves the interests of
the entire community, not just the seceding area.  Further, for
judges who are evaluating whether to allow a secession, the
manner in which the secession vote took place, particularly
whether it allowed the entire community impacted by the se-
cession to have some say, is a factor that judges could weigh in
their decision.
2. Assessing the Impact of the Secessions on the
Viability of the Larger Community
A second factor that should be considered is how the seces-
sions will impact the viability of the greater community, mean-
ing both the seceding territory and the territory from which
secession is sought.  This could be measured by evaluating: (i)
the economic impact of the secessions on both the territory
from which secession is sought and the territory which is se-
ceding—both must be capable of being financially sound
standing alone;341 (ii) how the existence of the new territory
might impact residential location patterns; and (iii) whether the
new district lines might serve a recruitment function that
draws more affluent (and typically white) families to the munic-
ipality where the new district is located, potentially creating
inequalities across the region as a whole.342  Secessions that
would weaken the viability of the seceding territory, or the
greater region as a whole, are most likely to evidence destruc-
tive localism and should be disfavored.
3. Enhanced Tenets of Classic Localism for the Larger
Community as a Whole, Not Just the Seceding
Area
The tenets of classic localism, namely a more efficient gov-
ernment, greater citizen participation, and an enhanced sense
of community, are certainly laudable goals.  Research suggests
that decentralization down to lower levels of government may
indeed bring about the tenets of classic localism for the lower
level of government, particularly in the context of school gov-
341 As other scholars examining feasibility of secessions have noted, one way
to evaluate the economic viability of a secession is to consider “such factors as the
existing revenue base, the current cost of providing municipal services, the capac-
ity of the new government to enter the bond market, and the overall health of the
local economy.”  Viteritti, supra note 129, at 42.  Similar factors could be adopted R
in assessing the economic viability of municipal secessions from school districts.
342 For a thorough discussion of the recruitment role that school district
boundary lines might play, see WEIHER, supra note 334, at 35–36. R
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ernance.343  Yet because of the limitations inherent in the de-
fault definitions of “local area” and “community,” the classic
benefits of localism rarely accrue to the relevant larger commu-
nity when decentralization or secession occurs; instead it typi-
cally only occurs for the area that has seceded or been afforded
the enhanced power of decentralization.  For example, a num-
ber of the county-based districts from which municipal seces-
sions occurred are now facing financial, student performance,
and reputational harms as a result of the secessions.344  Such
harms impair the ability to provide a high-quality public educa-
tion to the students remaining in the county-based districts.
This is particularly problematic in the context of public
education because, as other scholars have noted, localism in
public education is not only supposed to provide benefits in
terms of “the quality of education but also the quality of democ-
racy.”345  Thus, in normatively evaluating the legitimacy of the
localism justification for any secession or form of decentraliza-
tion in public education, a key criterion should be how far the
tenets of classic localism will actually reach.
4. Protections for Traditionally Marginalized Minority
Groups
The fourth and final criterion that should be considered is
whether the secession or decentralization process has protec-
tions for traditionally marginalized minority groups.  This crite-
rion is particularly important in light of the Southern history of
racial segregation in schools.  Staunch adherence to localism
in public education can cause a re-entrenchment of racial seg-
regation.  There is no question that decentralization through
mechanisms such as secession often reify racial segregation
through the use of race-neutral municipal boundary lines.  The
343 For example, research has shown that decentralization in the public school
context down from the school district to the individual school can be very benefi-
cial to individual schools. See, e.g., James M. Ferris, School-Based Decision Mak-
ing: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 333, 336
(1992) (describing the benefits of decentralization down from the school district to
the individual school as being that “[t]hose closest to the students are in the best
position to judge their needs and abilities and, hence, to choose the most suitable
methods and technologies for successful learning.”).
344 See, e.g., Burylo, supra note 132 (summarizing financial consequences to R
the Montgomery County School District as a result of the town of Pike Road
seceding, including an $8,400,000 loss in the Montgomery County school system
budget); Eaton, supra note 3 (describing the adverse academic impact of the R
municipal secessions on the county-based school systems).
345 Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495,
522 (2010).
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demographics of the newly formed suburban municipal school
districts are a testament to that.
In areas with a history of racial segregation and subordina-
tion, legislatures could require some form of regional coopera-
tion between the county-based school district and the new
suburban municipal district in order to ensure that minorities
and the poor are not trapped in the county-based districts
without an exit option.  One such example might be to enact
comprehensive interdistrict transfer agreements or to require
some form of revenue sharing between the new municipal dis-
tricts and the county-based districts.346  Enacting such mea-
sures might ensure that at least some protections exist for
historically marginalized minorities to protect against reen-
trenchment of racial and economic segregation in Southern
schools.
In sum, the aforementioned framework offers some criteria
for evaluating the legitimacy of the localism justification for
municipal secessions or decentralization in public education
more broadly.  Most notably, though the framework does not
offer an exhaustive list of criteria, it lays the groundwork for
ensuring that municipal secessions (or decentralization in pub-
lic education more broadly) do not perpetuate harmful destruc-
tive localism.
CONCLUSION
The South has a long and ignominious history of resisting
school desegregation.  After a long and hard-fought legal battle,
however, schools in the South made substantial progress, ulti-
mately becoming among the most desegregated schools in the
country.  That progress was unfortunately short-lived.  The Su-
preme Court’s modern-day school desegregation jurisprudence
severely undercut the progress made in desegregating public
schools by decontextualizing the significance of racially identi-
fiable schools.  A key consequence of the Court’s jurisprudence
is that racial segregation in schools is now both legally and
culturally normalized.  Indeed, since racially segregated neigh-
borhood schools now operate with the imprimatur of the law,
346 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 1476–78 (describing a regional system of R
school governance between a school district in Omaha, Nebraska and eleven
outer-lying suburbs in which the districts agreed upon a system that would allow
for student assignments and transfers between the school districts as well as a
revenue sharing plan in which a tax was levied across both the Omaha school
district and suburban school district, which resulted in funds the state then
“redistributed . . . from the levy to individual school districts based on their level of
need according to a formula generated by the state.”).
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few people voice objections to them.  Instead they are accepted
as an inevitable reality that cannot be changed absent ex-
traordinary measures.
The aforementioned legal and cultural normalization of ra-
cial segregation in schools arguably paved the way for predomi-
nately white and affluent school districts to secede from
racially diverse county-based schools with minimal protest or
objection.  The asserted basis for the secessions is that subur-
ban municipalities should have more local control and auton-
omy over their schools, or classic localism.  Proponents of the
secessions suggest that the only way to obtain the benefits of
classic localism is through decentralization of school govern-
ance down to the municipal, rather than the county, level.
Yet, this Article demonstrates that suburban municipal se-
cessions from county-based school districts are premised on
an incomplete and misleading understanding of localism.  It
suggests that localism can no longer be used to obfuscate the
reality of the racial retrenchment represented by the lawful
school secessions.  It also sets forth a normative framework for
assessing the legitimacy of the localism justifications for school
district secessions generally and decentralization of public ed-
ucation structures more broadly.  Importantly, finding ways to
evaluate the harms of localism in a racially plural society is
crucial.  If we do not, we will allow the wholesale resegregation
of schools under the guise of a facially race-neutral device such
as localism.
